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Abstract
The proliferation of human rights disclosure and due diligence laws around the globe is a
welcome development in the area of business and human rights. Corresponding improvement in
conditions for workers and communities in global supply chains whose human rights are impacted
by businesses has not materialized, however. In this Article, we focus on the oversight and
enforcement features of human rights disclosure and due diligence laws as one of the missing links
to achieving the accountability objectives envisaged by such legislation. Drawing on our analysis
of key legislative developments, we observe and critique that the state has almost completely
withdrawn itself from the oversight and enforcement roles and assigned these crucial accountability
functions solely to consumers, civil society, and investors. Without a regulatory mechanism to
ensure quality of human rights disclosures and due diligence processes and to impose sanctions for
failing to comply with the laws, not only may the disclosures and processes be inadequate, but
there is a danger that misleading disclosures and flawed processes may mask harmful impacts
and be detrimental to any hopes of vindicating the rights of workers and communities in global
supply chains. We offer a new perspective on a more effective approach to oversight and enforcement
in which the state should function as a key actor through which consumers, civil society, and
investors can hold businesses accountable.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
In response to intense civil society pressure and increasing public awareness
of appalling human rights impacts of businesses, including working conditions
amounting to slavery and forced labor,1 several governments have committed
themselves to take action to prevent human rights abuses by businesses and to
eradicate modern slavery in global supply chains.2 State efforts to date have
primarily concentrated on increasing transparency in parent or lead companies.3
The United States and some countries in Europe have adopted legislation that
requires companies to make annual public disclosures containing information
about their human rights impacts.4 While transparency can fulfill complementary
prevention and accountability functions alongside other measures, such as
strengthening local trade union involvement and setting clear liability standards to
eradicate adverse human rights impacts by business, it can only do so if designed
diligently and implemented robustly. The design of existing human rights
transparency rules has allowed highly ineffective reporting practices to emerge.5
For instance, a large number of businesses covered under the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act fail to disclose all the required information,
and many do not have a disclosure statement at all.6 Human rights disclosures
under existing legislation are at best minimal in their reporting of risks and at worst

1
2

3

4
5

6

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUPPLY CHAINS 5–8 (2016).
See, e.g., Theresa May, My Government Will Lead the Way in Defeating Modern Slavery, THE TELEGRAPH
(July 30, 2016, 10:01 PM), https://perma.cc/37ZE-DW8T. “Modern slavery” is not used as a legal
term of art, but rather to encompass exploitative practices including forced labor, bonded labor,
human trafficking, and child labor. Justine Nolan & Gregory Bott, Global Supply Chains and Human
Rights: Spotlight on Forced Labour and Modern Slavery Practices, 24 AUSTRALIAN J. HUM. RTS. 44, 47
(2018).
See, e.g., Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30 §§ 1–62, § 54 sched. 1–5 (U.K.) [hereinafter MSA]. There
are, in addition, legal provisions to address domestic instances of modern slavery. See Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–14 [hereinafter TVPA].
See, e.g., TVPA, supra note 3; MSA, supra note 3.
See Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Rühmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home State Regulation: A
Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on Global Supply Chain Governance,
8 GLOB. POL’Y 15 (2017); CORE COAL., RISK AVERSE: COMPANY REPORTING ON RAW MATERIAL
AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC RISKS UNDER THE TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS CLAUSE IN THE UK
MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015 3 (2017); Justine Nolan, Hardening Soft Law: Are the Emerging Corporate
Social Disclosure Laws Capable of Generating Substantive Compliance with Human Rights?, 15 BRAZ. J. INT’L
L. 65 (2018); see also U.K. HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., HUMAN RIGHTS
AND BUSINESS 2017: PROMOTING RESPONSIBILITY AND ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY, 2016–17, HL
153, HC 443.
See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 556 (West) [hereinafter
CTSCA]; Andrew G. Barna, The Early Eight and the Future of Consumer Legal Activism to Fight ModernDay Slavery in Corporate Supply Chains, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1449, 1463 (2018) (citing the statistic
that only 62 percent of covered companies disclosed).
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misleading about human rights impacts across global supply chains and
subsidiaries.7
There have been various efforts to address the shortcomings of
transparency-focused laws, including the adoption of the French Law on
Corporate Duty of Vigilance,8 German businesses’ push for new human rights
due diligence laws,9 and the European Union’s announcement that it will likely
enact a due diligence law in 2021.10 The process of human rights due diligence
(HRDD) requires companies to identify, prevent, mitigate, and communicate risks
to human rights.11 If done properly, it can transform corporate behavior and
prevent harms.12 Company reports of human rights impacts and due diligence
provide information to stakeholders to enable them to make informed choices
about their interactions with the corporation. As such, they act as an important
component of an overall corporate accountability framework for human rights
impacts. Push for transformation can come from external or internal sources—
information found in reports might trigger external stakeholder pressure to
transform corporate behavior, or the information gathering and disclosing process
might influence internal decision making.13 If such a transformation materializes,
disclosures and HRDD can achieve prevention and mitigation of adverse human
rights impacts. But to be able to fulfill these transformation and prevention
functions, HRDD must be done properly, and reporting must contain
information that is accurate and provides a complete and meaningful picture of
the disclosed issues. The current designs of transparency and HRDD laws do not
contain adequate safeguards to ensure duties are carried out properly and in
accordance with the relevant legislation.

7

See, e.g., CORE COAL., supra note 5.

8

See Loi 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des
entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of Mar. 27, 2017 on the Duty of Vigilance of Parent
Companies and Ordering Companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[Official Gazette Of France], Mar. 28, 2017.

9

Business and Human Rights: German Companies Push for Mandatory Due Diligence Law, INT’L BAR ASSOC.
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/PQB3-X3TU.

10

See CORE COAL., 25 NGOS AND TRADE UNIONS CALL FOR A UK LAW ON MANDATORY HUMAN
RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE (2019); EU to Legislate for Human Rights and Environment Due Diligence,
HAUSFELD LLP (2020), https://perma.cc/5T89-V7DE.
See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Guiding Principles of Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework,
¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].

11

12

13

See generally Robert G. Eccles & George Serafeim, Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional
Perspective, in CORPORATE STEWARDSHIP: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE EFFECTIVENESS (Susan A.
Mohrman et al. eds., 2015); Karin Buhmann, Neglecting the Proactive Aspect of Human Rights Due
Diligence? A Critical Appraisal of the EU's Non-Financial Reporting Directive as a Pillar One Avenue for
Promoting Pillar Two Action, 3 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 23, 35 (2018).
See Buhmann, supra note 12.
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Most worryingly, the transparency and due diligence rules discussed in this
Article typically require minimal substantive disclosure and largely adopt only
“non-coercive enforcement,”14 which leaves the watchdog role almost exclusively
to consumers, investors, and NGOs.15 Without a regulatory oversight mechanism
to ensure the quality of disclosures and to impose sanctions for misleading
information, not only may the reporting be inadequate, but also the disclosures
may present false realities and be detrimental to any hopes of improving rights of
workers and communities in the global supply chain. The question of oversight
and enforcement, however, remains underexplored in the literature.
This Article makes a novel contribution to the ongoing discussions about
how to improve human rights disclosure and due diligence laws to achieve the
stated legislative aims. It has been observed and critiqued that the oversight and
enforcement features of these laws remain weak or nonexistent.16 Taking this as
our starting point, we first offer a new framing of the problem by analyzing how
these laws assign oversight and enforcement roles between the state and the
market. We critique that the state has almost completely withdrawn itself from the
oversight and enforcement roles and assigned these crucial accountability
functions primarily to consumers, civil society, and investors. As discussed below,
even in the case of the French Law, civil society acts as the main driver of
oversight. We argue in favor of greater state involvement in transnational business
regulation as it concerns the human rights impacts of businesses. We argue that
state-based enforcement and oversight constitute necessary ingredients for public
disclosures and HRDD to contribute to the improvement of human rights
conditions in supply chains and to achieve accountability for adverse business
impacts on human rights. We offer a new perspective on a more effective
approach to oversight and enforcement that distinguishes human rights
disclosures and due diligence from traditional corporate reporting and due
diligence. Our approach assigns these functions primarily to a public authority that
should have expertise in both corporate governance and human rights and would
also function as an enabler for consumers, civil society, and investors to hold
businesses accountable.
The Article begins in Section II by unpacking the concept of accountability
in the context of business impacts on human rights. Next, Section III outlines and
compares the HRDD and reporting requirements under key examples of the
relevant legislation: the E.U. Non-Financial Reporting Directive (enacted 2014);
14

Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitation of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 1, 12 (2017).

15

See TIM BARTLEY, RULES WITHOUT RIGHTS: LANDS, LABOR, AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 12, 40 (Oxford, 2018) (noting that corporate codes of conduct and private
social or ethical audits are the prime examples of this mode of governance).
See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 5, at 68–71; LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 5.

16
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the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance of 2017; the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (CTSCA); the U.K. Modern Slavery
Act 2015 (MSA); the Australian Modern Slavery Act 2018 (AMSA); the U.S.
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 § 1502; the E.U. Conflict Minerals Regulation (enacted
2017); and the Dutch Child Labor Law (enacted 2019). In doing so, the Article
briefly addresses the reasons behind the enactment of the laws, the transparency
and HRDD requirements they contain, and the institutional arrangements
supporting these requirements, in order to give the reader context for the
discussion that follows.
Building on the existing scholarship,17 the analysis in Sections IV and V
frames the approach of the existing legislation to oversight and enforcement as
market-led and critiques this model of oversight and enforcement. In Section VI,
we argue that enforcement of these laws via regulatory oversight, alongside market
oversight, is essential for achieving their accountability objectives. We then
evaluate the options for regulatory oversight of HRDD and reporting. Here, we
analyze the distinguishing features of human rights reporting from financial and
other types of non-financial reporting.18 We urge policymakers to move away from
placing HRDD and reporting within the realm of traditional corporate reporting
and instead to adopt a sui generis model of oversight that marries corporate
reporting expertise with human rights expertise.

II. W HAT I S A CCOUNTABILITY IN T HIS C O NTEXT AND W HAT
A RE THE V ARIOUS T OOLS FOR A CCOUNTABILITY ?
Corporate accountability represents a movement away from the voluntarism
and self-regulation that characterize contemporary corporate social responsibility
(CSR).19 For Peter Newell, “the term [accountability] implies both a measure of
answerability (providing an account for actions undertaken) and enforceability
(punishment or sanctions for poor performance or illegal conduct).”20 In the
context of business impacts on human rights, we conceive of accountability as a
wider concept than liability, encompassing the idea that companies should be held
responsible for the consequences of their actions via non-legal accountability (risk
of loss of reputation, denial of access to foreign markets, fall in share price, and
17

See, e.g., Justine Nolan, Human Rights and Global Corporate Supply Chains: Is Effective Supply Chain
Accountability Possible?, in BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEXT AND
CONTOURS 248 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2017); Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 14.

18

Other types of non-financial reporting include diversity, governance, and environmental
performance.

19

See generally Renginee G. Pillay, The Limits to Self-Regulation and Voluntarism: From Corporate Social
Responsibility to Corporate Accountability, 99 AMICUS CURAE 10 (2014).

20

Peter Newell, From Responsibility to Citizenship: Corporate Accountability for Development, INST. DEV.
STUD., Apr. 2002, at 1–2.
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shareholder dissent) as well as legal accountability through regulators or courts of
law.21 We concur with Simon Zadek’s common-sense opinion that for
accountability to work, there must be “capability to do something about [a given
action and] . . . some level of consensus about the action that needs to be
accounted for and the penalties for failure . . . [Additionally, there needs to be] a
reasonably well-defined ‘community’ that can reach such decisions.”22
In following Zadek’s criteria, one must first determine what needs to be
accounted for in the context of transparency and due diligence for human rights
abuses in a company’s supply chains and subsidiaries. Second, one must determine
what consequences and penalties may attach to performance that falls below the
expected or required standard and what processes are needed to assess compliance
and impose sanctions.
Determining the scope of accountability can be a complex task where the
disclosure obligations are placed on parent or lead companies even though the
presence of human rights abuses in those companies’ subsidiaries or supply chains
may not be contrary to any legal requirement or obligation placed on the parent
or lead company. The corporate law concepts of corporate personality, limited
liability, and the contractual nature of relationships with suppliers insulate parent
or lead companies from liability for harm caused by subsidiaries and suppliers.23
Therefore, at least in theory, legal liability falls on the subsidiary, supplier, or subsupplier that is directly linked to the human rights harm rather than the lead
company that sells the end product.24 For instance, the MSA imposes criminal
liability only for slavery and human trafficking that take place within the U.K.25
Accountability arises from the presence of slavery within a business organization.
By contrast, supply chain accountability for slavery and human trafficking
overseas through the Act is achieved through disclosure of the steps taken to
identify and eliminate these practices.26 Unlike the former type of criminal
accountability that applies in the domestic context, the latter obligation is neither

21

22

23

24

25
26

David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 334, 335 (2011).
Simon Zadek, The Meaning of Accountability, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO
PRACTICE 240, 241 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2016).
See generally KATHARINA PISTOR, CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND
INEQUALITY (2019).
However, it is still possible for a parent or lead company to be directly liable for the harms suffered
as a result of a subsidiary’s acts or omissions. See Vendanta Resources v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20
(appeal taken from Eng.); Chandler v. Cape [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (appeal taken from Eng.). The
French Law places a legal requirement on the parent company to conduct due diligence in its supply
chain. See Loi 2017-399, supra note 8.
See MSA, supra note 3, §§ 1–2.
Id. § 54.
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an obligation of result nor an obligation of due diligence to eliminate slavery
within supply chains. Instead, it is an obligation to report the steps, if any, taken
to eliminate slavery. The presence of human rights abuses and modern slavery
practices legally distant from the parent or lead company renders it difficult to
define what action needs to be accounted for in modern slavery or human rights
disclosures, particularly if a legally-mandated due diligence obligation is lacking.
At the outset, the conduct that needs to be accounted for is the failure on a
parent or lead company’s part to make diligent efforts to identify, prevent,
mitigate, and eliminate human rights abuses in its subsidiaries and supply chains
and to disclose adequately the steps taken.27 This is just one piece of the wider
puzzle of accountability. We are not looking at other pieces of the puzzle such as
the role of state oversight and enforcement through civil or criminal liability for
human rights harms. Relatedly, we are not looking at this from the perspective of
access to remedy. Our concern is whether the current disclosure and HRDD
frameworks improve accountability: (1) to victims of business human rights
impacts and (2) to those affected indirectly as consumers, customers, or investors
who buy from and/or invest in the company on the understanding that it is doing
all that can be reasonably expected to prevent and remediate human rights abuses
and modern slavery in its global supply chains.
There is a spectrum of regulatory approaches to bringing about corporate
accountability in terms of the consequences that will attach to poor performance,
ranging from light-touch (private-led regulation) to stringent regulation with
binding standards enforced by public authorities.28 Genevieve LeBaron and
Andreas Rühmkorf observe that home state regulation on business and human
rights has been “enacted through a range of different institutional designs that
combine elements and instruments of public and private governance.”29 That said,
as will be seen in Section III, a heavy emphasis has thus far been placed on various
degrees of transparency accompanied by market-centered accountability
mechanisms at the light-touch end of the spectrum. This mode of regulation is a
move away from traditional “command and control” regulation, in which
governments adopt “legal rules backed by [civil or criminal] sanctions,”30 toward

27

This accords with the due diligence requirements of the U.N. See UNGPs, supra note 11, at 21–22.

28

See LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 5, at 17–19, 26. Compare Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, §§ 1–20,
sched. 1–2 (U.K.), with MSA, supra note 3 (highlighting that, under these categories, the former
produced significant changes in corporate practice while the latter has not).
See LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 5, at 17.

29
30

See David J. Doorey, Who Made That? Influencing Foreign Labor Practices Through Reflexive Domestic
Disclosure Legislation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 366 (2005).
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what is termed “reflexive” regulation,31 or “New Governance.”32 Through this
mechanism, the government acts as “the orchestrator of private actors to
encourage compliance”33 and attempts to “influence normative practices indirectly
by shaping the context in which society’s various actors and subsystems interact
and bargain with one another.”34 This model has been widely supported by the
CSR literature due to its promise of effecting organizational and lasting change,35
whereas command-and-control type regulation has been viewed with skepticism
due to its potential to produce a tick-box approach to human rights issues.36
Human rights disclosure laws discussed in this Article largely adopt this lighttouch regulation model based on a market-led model of accountability. Recent
developments suggest a slow, gradual movement toward more stringent
regulation, with a new legislative approach featuring a legal duty to conduct
HRDD and to publish HRDD information backed by certain penalties and civil
liability for failure to comply.37 Karin Buhmann has argued that for the light-touch
approach to be successful, it needs to properly encourage organizational learning
and not merely focus on penalties for non-disclosure.38 While the organizational
learning focus is crucial, decades of voluntarism and soft regulation in this field
have not produced successful outcomes when the bottom line of business remains
profit oriented.39 One reason for this lack of meaningful progress is the lack of
stringent legal accountability mechanisms to push businesses to take disclosure
31

32

33
34
35
36

37

38
39

Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 239, 242
(1983). In the context of the nature of social disclosure rules, see generally Barnali Choudhury, Social
Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 207 (2016).
David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate
Accountability Through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 454–55 (2007) (describing New
Governance as “process-oriented, flexible, participatory, and experimental”).
See Nolan, supra note 5, at 70.
See Doorey, supra note 30, at 357.
See Hess, supra note 32.
See Pillay, supra note 19 (providing an overview and critique of the voluntary and light-touch
approaches to regulation of corporate human rights impacts). See generally Responding to Modern Slavery
– New UK Benchmarking Report, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://perma.cc/8E9S-6RPV.
See Loi 2017-399, supra note 8; The Netherlands Takes an Historic Step by Adopting Child Labor Due
Diligence Law, MVO PLATFORM (May 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/UW7H-W9BP; Frequently Asked
Questions About the New Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law, MVO PLATFORM (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://perma.cc/W8LM-SPPT; see also Saskia Wilks & Johannes Blankenbach, Will Germany Become
a Leader in the Drive for Corporate Due Diligence on Human Rights?, BUS. AND HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Feb.
20, 2019), https://perma.cc/SD2U-25PA; Details about the Initiative, SWISS COAL. FOR CORP. JUST.,
https://perma.cc/4TBM-585Z.
See Buhmann, supra note 12, at 39.
See Pillay, supra note 19. On the voluntary approach of multi-stakeholder initiatives, see Not Fit-forPurpose: The Grand Experiment of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Corporate Accountability, Human Rights and
Global Governance, MSINTEGRITY (July 2020), https://perma.cc/MCW4-WHLL.
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and HRDD obligations seriously. It has been argued by critics of the current
transparency rules that without, as a minimum, an accompanying HRDD
obligation and civil, administrative, or criminal liability for failure to comply, these
rules cannot effectively contribute to corporate accountability.40 The analysis in
the latter parts of this Article discusses the necessity for state-based oversight and
enforcement supported by stakeholders as an essential ingredient for the efficacy
of any laws, whether they comprise transparency obligations only or they include
the additional requirement of HRDD. This is crucial to ensure the avoidance of a
disconnect between what is reported in corporate disclosures and the actual
human rights situation on the ground.41
Both transparency and HRDD are requirements of the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).42 The UNGPs, which were
adopted unanimously by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011, represent a
consensus of opinion among a number of states, companies, and nongovernmental organizations, about the human rights responsibilities of
corporations. The UNGPs expect business actors to “operationalize” their
responsibility to respect human rights through HRDD and reporting processes.43
Businesses are expected to communicate the steps they take to address human
rights impacts by publishing sufficiently-detailed information on the impacts and
steps taken to prevent, mitigate, and remediate these in appropriate form and
frequency.44
The commentary on reporting explains “showing” that businesses respect
human rights involves companies communicating and “providing a measure of
transparency and accountability to individuals or groups who may be impacted
and to other relevant stakeholders, including investors.”45 Thus, reporting under
the UNGPs is not an end in itself but, theoretically at least, is an exercise that will
provide a measure of accountability.46 Reporting alone is not sufficient, however,
and the reporting provisions in the UNGPs are supplemented by a requirement
that companies conduct HRDD. This process entails identifying whether they
40

41

42
43

44

45
46

See LeBaron and Rühmkorf, supra note 5; Nolan, supra note 5; U.K. HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT JOINT
COMM. ON HUM. RTS., supra note 5.
For an analysis of such a disconnect, see Madhura Rao & Nadia Bernaz, Corporate Responsibility for
Human Rights in Assam Tea Plantations - A Business and Human Rights Approach, SUSTAINABILITY 2020,
12, 7409.
See UNGPs, supra note 11.
See id. (noting that UNGPs 16–24 are the “operational principles” in relation to the corporate
responsibility to respect pillar).
Id. For an exploration of reporting under the UNGPs, see UN Guiding Principles Reporting
Framework, SHIFT & MAZARS (2015), https://perma.cc/XZV8-R7MB.
UNGPs, supra note 11, at 20.
But see, e.g., Jena Martin, Hiding in the Light: The Misuse of Disclosure to Advance the Business and Human
Rights Agenda, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 530 (2018) (challenging this viewpoint).
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have caused or contributed to adverse human rights impacts, integrating and
acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and remediating the harm if an
adverse impact has occurred.47 The enactment of transparency and HRDD laws
are illustrative of the polycentric governance described in the UNGPs.
The knowing-and-showing approach of the UNGPs has been a welcome
shift from the naming-and-shaming approach.48 We argue here that for the
“showing” to be reliable and not misleading, there needs to be a reliable system
of oversight. While the UNGPs acknowledge the role of transparency in achieving
corporate accountability, Principle 3 and its commentary leave it up to each state
to determine the type of transparency measures to be introduced. According to
Principle 3, the states should encourage or require businesses to be transparent on
how they address their human rights impacts.49 As far as transparency measures
go, the expectations of the UNGPs could be fulfilled by states introducing or
maintaining the “light-touch” regulations and mandating reporting without any
follow-up measures. The UNGPs place no clear expectations on states to
introduce robust measures of oversight and enforcement for transparency
requirements. We argue in this Article that such measures are a crucial element of
transparency and HRDD laws to ensure corporate accountability.

III. K EY F EATURES OF H UMAN R IGHTS D ISCLOSURE AND D UE
D ILIGENCE L AWS
We divide the legislation mandating disclosure and/or HRDD into two main
categories: (1) general HRDD and disclosure laws and (2) laws that target a specific
human rights issue.50 The key features of the different laws are outlined below,
with particular focus on two distinct elements: the type of disclosure required and
the processes in place (or the lack thereof) to ensure accessibility and accuracy of
the disclosures.

47

48
49
50

UNGPs, supra note 11, at 20–21. On human rights due diligence under the UNGPs; see generally
Björn Fasterling, Human Rights Due Diligence as Risk Management: Social Risk Versus Human Rights Risk,
2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 225 (2017); see also Buhmann, supra note 12; Kendyl Salcito & Mark Wielga,
What Does Human Rights Due Diligence for Business Relationships Really Look Like on the Ground?, 3 BUS.
& HUM. RTS. J. 113 (2018).
Buhmann, supra note 12, at 39.
See UNGPs, supra note 11, at 8–9.
See generally Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 87 (2014); David Hess, The Transparency Trap: Non-Financial Disclosure and the Responsibility
of Business to Respect Human Rights, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 5 (2019).
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A. General Human Rights Due Diligence and Disclosure
In this section, we focus on the E.U. Non-Financial Reporting Directive
(E.U. NFRD) and the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance.51 The
E.U. NFRD applies to all companies of a certain size governed by laws of
individual E.U. Member States.52 These companies are required to report on
human rights and related matters “to the extent necessary for an understanding of
the undertaking’s development, performance and position and of the impact of
its activity.”53 Companies must additionally disclose HRDD processes
implemented by the company in pursuing policies related to non-financial matters,
the corresponding outcome, and the principal risks arising in connection with the
company’s operations, including how the company manages these risks.54 The
provision adopts a “comply or explain” approach, meaning that companies can
elect to comply with it either by making the required disclosures or by providing
an explanation for why they have elected not to do so.55 The E.U. NFRD leaves
it up to each E.U. member state to determine whether to require verification of
reports by an independent assurance service provider and whether to have a
sanctions regime for companies that fail to report adequately. At a minimum, each
member state is to require checks by an auditor for the existence of a report. 56
Some member states have implemented legislation requiring these disclosures to
be made in the management report,57 and some have imposed additional checks.58
Thus, member states vary in the checks they have in place, but it has largely fallen
to the “market” to oversee reporting.

51

52

53
54
55

56

57

58

Directive No. 2014/95 of the European Parliament and of Council of 22 October 2014 amending
Directive No. 2013/34 as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 57 (EU); Loi 2017-399, supra note 8.
Directive No. 2014/95, supra note 51. These are certain large companies and qualifying partnerships
with more than 500 employees.
Id.
Id.
Virginia E. Harper Ho, Comply or Explain and the Future of Nonfinancial Reporting, 21 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 317, 321 (2017).
According to a study reviewing how member states have transposed the directive into their national
law, twenty member states only require the existence of the reports to be verified and not the
content. The states are Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and Norway. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, MEMBER STATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF HOW MEMBER
STATES ARE IMPLEMENTING THE EU DIRECTIVE ON NON-FINANCIAL AND DIVERSITY
INFORMATION 1, 16–31 (2017).
See id. Eight states require consistency checks with the management report: Belgium, Bulgaria,
Denmark, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, U.K., and Iceland.
For instance, Denmark. This subject is taken up in Section VI below.
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In France, the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance requires
companies meeting the threshold requirements for size59 to create and implement
an annual “vigilance plan” aimed at identifying and preventing human rights
violations in both their domestic and their international operations, including
those associated with their subsidiaries and supply chain.60 The first plans were
published in 2018. The development and the publication of the plan and a report
on its implementation are among the substantive obligations prescribed by the
“duty of vigilance.”61 The plan must set out the steps that the company will take
to detect risks and prevent serious violations with respect to human rights and
fundamental freedoms, health and safety, and the environment.62 This includes
mapping out and analyzing the risks and putting measures in place to mitigate risks
and address negative impacts, including an alert mechanism and a monitoring
scheme to follow up on the plan’s implementation.63 Unlike most of the other
laws discussed in this Article, the French law’s transparency requirement can only
be fulfilled by complying. There is no room for compliance by explaining why no
steps have been taken because taking the prescribed steps is a fundamental
obligation placed on companies covered under the law. Since the development,
implementation, and communication of the plan together constitute the vigilance
duty, the French law brings together the HRDD and transparency elements of the
UNGPs’ second pillar previously discussed in Section II.
Compliance with the law is established through a court process whereby
companies can be legally compelled—at the request of a party with standing,
including an NGO or a trade union—to create and implement an adequate
vigilance plan.64 Prior to the initiation of a court process, companies will be given
a three-month period to comply with the requirements of the law. Periodic
penalties may be imposed by the court if companies are found to be failing their
vigilance obligations. To date, a small number of notices have been served to
companies, at the initiative of civil society organizations (CSOs), on the basis of
59

60

61

62
63
64

The law applies to any company registered in France that has (a) 5,000 or more employees, including
employees of its direct or indirect French-registered subsidiaries; or (b) 10,000 or more employees,
including employees of its direct or indirect French-registered or foreign subsidiaries. See Loi 2017399, supra note 8, art. 1. It is estimated that the law applies to about 150 companies. See Anna
Triponel & John Sherman, Legislating Human Rights Due Diligence: Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls to
the French Duty of Vigilance Law, INT’L BAR ASS’N (2017), https://perma.cc/SX59-5N5K.
See Loi 2017-399, supra note 8, art. 1, ¶ 3 (covering the companies that the company controls directly
or indirectly and, moving down the supply chain, the activities of its subcontractors and suppliers
“with which [it] maintains an established commercial relationship”).
Stéphane Brabant & Elsa Savourey, France’s Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law: A Closer Look at the
Penalties Faced by Companies, in REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA COMPLIANCE ET DE L’ÉTHIQUE DES
AFFAIRES 1–7 (Dec. 2017).
Loi 2017-399, supra note 8.
Id. ¶¶ 4–9.
Id. ¶¶ 7–9; Brabant & Savourey, supra note 61, at 4.
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inadequate vigilance plans, and two of these incidents have proceeded to the
courts at the end of the three-month notice period.65 Accountability also takes
place through a process by which victims who have been harmed by a company
covered by the legislation can claim damages for negligence through an ordinary
civil lawsuit, using the company’s noncompliance with the vigilance obligation as
evidence of its wrongdoing.66
Combining HRDD and transparency backed up with sanctions, the French
law is the most promising piece of legislation presently in force to advance
corporate accountability. It moves away from exclusively relying on market-led
oversight and enforcement of the law. It is not without shortcomings, however.
It has been highlighted that the law’s threshold for coverage is very high,67 the
sanctions available are weak in terms of remediating harms,68 and, most
importantly for the purposes of this Article, there is a lack of governmental
monitoring and oversight for compliance by covered companies.69 While the
French law takes a crucial step by attaching sanctions to the vigilance obligations,
in the absence of a state-initiated oversight mechanism it is left to the “market,”
typically CSOs, to monitor companies’ compliance and initiate the complaints
procedures available under the law. The lack of an official list and repository for
vigilance plans render it challenging for CSOs, trade unions, and other
stakeholders to identify shortcomings and take part in the enforcement of the
obligations.70 A preliminary proposal has been put forward to address this by
designating certain individuals within the French administration to look into
which companies are within the scope of the law, how the law is implemented,
and whether some provisions of the law need to be clarified.71 A need for formal
oversight and more robust enforcement constitutes the main focus of the analysis
presented in the later sections of this Article.
65

Decisions on the substance of the complaints are pending at the time of writing. See Stéphane
Brabant & Elsa Savourey, All Eyes on France – France Vigilance Law First Enforcement Cases: Current
Cases and Trends, Cambridge Core Blog (Jan. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/QZ2L-3HZU; Elsa
Savourey, All Eyes on France – France Vigilance Law First Enforcement Cases: The Challenges Ahead,
CAMBRIDGE CORE BLOG (Jan. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/ENZ3-9R9N.

66

Companies would incur civil liability under the French Civil Code Articles 1240 and 1241. See
generally Sandra Cossart et al., The French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making
Globalization Work for All, 2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 317 (2017).
FORUM CITOYEN POUR LA RSE, LAW ON DUTY OF VIGILANCE OF PARENT AND OUTSOURCING
COMPANIES YEAR ONE: COMPANIES MUST DO BETTER 1, 8 (Juliette Renaud et al. eds., 2019).
Brabant & Savourey, supra note 61, at 2–4.

67

68
69

See Duty of Vigilance Radar, VIGILANCE-PLAN, https://perma.cc/H9GM-EV8V (highlighting the
civil society initiative attempting to rectify the lack of formal monitoring and oversight).

70

Brabant & Savourey, supra note 61.
ANNE DUTHILLEUL & MATTHIAS DE JOUVENEL, EVALUATION DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA LOI
N° 2017-399 DU 27 MARS 2017 RELATIVE AU DEVOIR DE VIGILANCE DES SOCIÉTÉS MÈRES ET DES
ENTREPRISES DONNEUSES D’ORDRE (2020).

71
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B. Targeted Human Right Due Diligence and Disclosure
Targeted HRDD and transparency legislation focuses on specific issues such
as modern slavery, child labor, or conflict minerals. In this Section, we will first
examine laws mandating disclosure on modern slavery. The design of the three
statutes dealing directly with modern slavery is similar, although each legislative
scheme has slight variation. We will then examine a law mandating transparency
on conflict mineral due diligence, and lastly a law mandating due diligence on child
labor. A common theme relevant for the purposes of this Article is that these laws
rely on market-led oversight to ensure compliance with the law, to a greater or a
lesser extent.
The CTSCA, which came into force in January 2012, requires certain large
retail sellers and manufacturers doing business in the state of California to disclose
their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their direct supply
chain for tangible goods offered for sale.72 The disclosed information should be
posted on the retail seller or manufacturer’s website. Specifically, a company to
which the legislation applies must disclose to what extent, if any, it: verifies
product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and
slavery; conducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with
company standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains; requires direct
suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the product comply with the
laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country or countries in which
they are doing business; maintains internal accountability standards and
procedures for employees or contractors failing to meet company standards
regarding slavery and trafficking; and provides relevant training.73 There is no
requirement to update the report on a periodic basis. The California Franchise
Tax Board produces an annual list of companies covered by its provisions based
on information from tax returns.74 There is, however, no official repository where
these reports must be deposited for public access. While the presence of an official
list is crucially important for stakeholders to identify the companies covered by
the law, the lack of a central repository for accessing the reports renders it
challenging for stakeholders to identify companies failing to comply with the law.
A large number of covered businesses fail to disclose information on all the
required areas of activity, and many do not have a disclosure statement.75 The only

72
73
74

75

CTSCA, supra note 6.
Id. § 3(b).
KAMALA HARRIS, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE 3
(2015). Note, however, that the CTSCA does not require companies to report on an annual basis,
meaning that companies can comply with the law by reporting just once.
See Barna, supra note 6, at 1463 (noting that only sixty-two percent of covered companies disclosed).
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state-based relief under the CTSCA for failure to report is injunctive.76 Following
a compliance review in 2015, the California Department of Justice took steps to
improve compliance with the Act by writing to companies and asking them to
provide either an explanation of why the legislation does not apply to them or a
link to a compliant disclosure.77 To date, the Attorney General of California has
not yet brought an action against a corporation for nondisclosure under the Act.78
From the foregoing, it is not possible to conclude that the CTSCA provides robust
oversight and enforcement of the transparency obligations, leaving the “market”
to exercise checks and hold businesses accountable.
In the U.K., Section 54 of the MSA introduced a modern slavery and human
trafficking transparency requirement for certain “commercial organizations” with
a turnover of at least £36 million that “carry on” business in the U.K.79 The law
adopts a comply-or-explain approach by requiring companies to publish either a
statement of the steps the organization has taken to ensure slavery and human
trafficking is not taking place in any of its supply chains or in any part of its
business, or a statement that the organization has taken no such steps.80 The MSA
does not prescribe specific content for the disclosures, but provides a
nonexhaustive list of items that may be included in the “slavery and human
trafficking statement.” These items include information about a commercial
organization’s81 policies and due diligence processes in relation to slavery and
human trafficking in its business and supply chain; the parts of its business most
at risk of slavery; and human trafficking and steps put in place to assess and
manage that risk, including performance indicators for the success of these steps.82
The statement must be approved by the board of directors of a limited company
or all members of a limited liability partnership.83 The MSA covers steps taken in
“any of [a corporation's] supply chains,” a broader requirement than that in the

76

CTSCA, supra note 6, § 3(d).

77

Sarah Altschuller, The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: New Guidance and Increased
Enforcement Efforts, FOLEY HOAG (May 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/L3ZM-XFV8.

78

Memorandum from Jena Martin on Policy Options for Addressing and Preventing Forced Labor,
Modern Slavery, and Human Trafficking in Supply Chains (May 2020).

79

MSA, supra note 3, § 54; COMM. OF PUB. ACCT., Reducing Modern Slavery, 2017–19, HC 886, at 10
(U.K.).

80

CORE COAL., supra note 5, at 3 (estimating that Section 54 covers between 12,000 and 17,000
companies).

81

See MSA, supra note 3, § 54(12) (defining a commercial organization as it as a body corporate or
partnership “which carries on a business, or part of a business, in the United Kingdom”).

82

Id. § 54(5).
Id. § 54(6).

83
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CTSCA, which covers the direct supply chain only.84 The MSA also requires yearly
updates, in contrast to the CTSCA’s one-off approach.85 There is no official list,86
however, of companies that are required to report, meaning that stakeholders are
not able to verify if a company is covered by the law or not, although the U.K.
Home Office has written to 10,000 companies to which it believes the law may be
applicable.87 Nor is there an official database where such reports are deposited. 88
If a business falling under section 54 fails to report, the Secretary of State may
bring court proceedings for injunctive relief.89 As of yet, there has been no
instance of this happening in practice. There is no other means of enforcement or
oversight in the Act. Furthermore, there are no mechanisms to ensure the
accuracy of the report contents (though the report contents can be so vague under
this law that there seems little need for assurance). Thus, oversight and
enforcement are left to the “market.”
There have already been four reporting cycles under the MSA. Generally,
however, disclosure has been of a low standard, not always meeting even the
minimum requirements of the Act including approval of the statement by senior
management90 and visibility on the company website.91 Many companies have not
reported at all.92 Acknowledging deficiencies of the MSA, an independent review
of the Act published in 2019 recommended to the U.K. Government to: abandon
the comply-or-explain approach; adopt a comply approach with prescribed
minimum content for the report; create a repository for statements; establish a
monitoring and enforcement mechanism; and strengthen sanctions for failure to
comply.93
84

85
86
87
88
89

Id. § 54(4)(a)(i). Commercial organizations caught within the definition are not, however, required
to report on all the supply chains in their groups overseas, such as those of wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries. See Parosha Chandran, A Loophole in the Slavery Bill Could Allow Companies to Hide Supply
Chain Abuses, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/R2WL-J8EY.
MSA, supra note 3, § 54(4)(a).
See Section VI.A.1 for a discussion on the importance of a formal list.
COMM. OF PUB. ACCT., supra note 79, at 10.
See About Us, MODERN SLAVERY REGISTRY, https://perma.cc/YA5W-56KU.
MSA, supra note 3, § 54(11).

90

MSA, § 54(6). Depending on the type of entity, senior management could consist of the board of
directors, members, partners, or a general partner.

91

See BUS. AND HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., FTSE 100 AT THE STARTING LINE: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPANY
STATEMENTS UNDER THE UK MODERN SLAVERY ACT (2016); CORE COAL., supra note 5; BUS. &
HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., FIRST YEAR OF FTSE 100 REPORTS UNDER THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT:
TOWARDS ELIMINATION? (2017).

92

CORE COAL., WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED FROM CORE ¶ 8 (2018) (noting that sixty percent
of companies that are covered by section 54 have failed to produce a report).

93

SEC’Y OF ST. FOR THE HOME DEP’T, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015:
FINAL REPORT, 2019, Cp. 100, ¶ 17 (U.K.); see also COMM. OF PUB. ACCT., supra note 79, at 6

Winter 2021

339

Chicago Journal of International Law

Like the CTSCA and the MSA, the Australian Modern Slavery Act 2018
(AMSA) requires companies that meet a prescribed size threshold to report on the
risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains and actions taken to
assess and address those risks.94 This law abandons the comply-or-explain
approach adopted in the U.K. MSA. It is mandatory for companies to provide the
particular information on policies and processes to detect and address modern
slavery listed in the Act, meaning that companies cannot be selective about what
to report. The AMSA also makes provision for a government-funded central
repository for slavery and human trafficking statements,95 but it does not penalize
companies for noncompliance, though the Minister for Home Affairs can make
an inquiry if a company has not complied. If a company fails to respond, the
minister may publicly disclose information about the company’s failure to
comply.96 The law was passed in November 2018, and the first disclosure under
the Act was made in 2019. In terms of “enforcement,” the AMSA creates a
mechanism through which noncompliant entities can be asked to explain and
remedy their failure to report, or they risk being named on the governmentmaintained register. The relevant minister reports to Parliament annually on
compliance trends, enabling oversight of overall compliance patterns by
Parliamentarians. Otherwise, as with the other modern slavery reporting laws,
oversight and enforcement is left to the “market.”
Outside the arena of modern slavery, in the U.S., the Conflict Minerals Rule,
adopted in 201297—with the first reports filed in 2014—requires companies
reporting to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct due
diligence and to report on the sourcing of certain minerals (tin, tungsten, tantalum,
and gold). These companies must make reasonable and good faith efforts to
determine whether the specified minerals used in the manufacture of their
products originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo or its neighboring
countries. The companies must also disclose their determinations and describe
their country of origin inquiries to the SEC and on their company websites. Where
(recommending that the government should consider publishing a list of companies that have
complied and not complied with the legislation, rather than falling back on civil society to
undertake this work). The government has responded to the report, agreeing to this
recommendation. See HM TREASURY, TREASURY MINUTES: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS ON THE THIRTY FIRST TO THE THIRTY SEVENTH REPORTS FROM
SESSION 2017–19, 2018, Cm. 9634, 23 (U.K.).
94

See Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) s 5 (Austl.) (requiring companies to report if they carry on
business in Australia with a minimum annual consolidated revenue of AU$100 million).

95

Id. ss 18–20.
Id. s 16A.

96
97

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (amending Securities Exchange Act of
1934, ch. 404, § 13, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)). The Final Rule for the
implementation of § 1502 was approved by the SEC in August 2012. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b.400.
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this inquiry reveals that the minerals did originate in these countries, the company
must exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the mineral, in
accordance with a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence
framework.98 Where the due diligence confirms the company’s determination, it
must file a Conflict Minerals Report with the SEC and post the same on its
website. There is no list of companies that must comply with the Conflict Minerals
Rule, but an annual Government Audit Office report to congressional committees
examines how companies responded to the Conflict Minerals Rule in the previous
calendar year and analyzes a generalized random sample of company reports.99 In
terms of enforcement and sanctions, the Conflict Minerals Rule imposes penalties
on companies for not reporting or complying in good faith. Form SD (the form
used for submitting the disclosure) is deemed filed under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and subject to § 18 of the Exchange Act, which attaches liability for
any false or misleading statements. There has, however, been no SEC enforcement
action against companies for failure to comply with the Conflict Mineral Rule, 100
despite the mixed record of engagement and compliance among companies.101 In
the absence of enforcement by the regulator, the oversight and enforcement
functions are left to the “market.”
The E.U. has also passed a disclosure law aimed at supply chain due diligence
for the use of conflict minerals.102 This is company law, not securities law, “laying
down supply chain due diligence obligations for [E.U.] importers of tin, tantalum,
and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk
areas.”103 The Regulation will enter into force in 2021. The geographical scope of
the E.U. Regulation is broader than § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, targeting
imports not only from conflict zones and areas where a risk of armed
confrontation exists but also from failed states and areas where widespread and
98

See 15 U.S.C. § 78(m); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b.400. For more detail of what is required, see Olga
Ortega-Martin, Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations: From Voluntary Standards to Hard Law at
Last?, 32 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 44, 64–65 (2014).

99

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-607, Conflict Minerals (2019).
See Public Statement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Updated Statement on the Effect
of the Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule (Apr. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/FZ67-VK3B (indicating that the staff of the SEC would not recommend
enforcement action if companies only file a Form SD, and not a Conflict Minerals Report).
Companies are being encouraged to continue to file Conflict Minerals Reports, and many continue
to do so. See id.
See Mining the Disclosures 2019: An Investor Guide to Conflict Minerals and Cobalt Reporting in Year Six,
RESPONSIBLE SOURCING NETWORK (2019), https://perma.cc/SZ5H-4H8Z.
Regulation 2017/821, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017, Laying
Down Supply Chain Due Diligence Obligations for Union Importers of Tin, Tantalum and
Tungsten, Their Ores, and Gold Originating from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, art. 6,
2017 O.J. (L 130) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Regulation 2017/821].
Id.

100

101

102

103
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systematic violations of international law, including human rights abuses, occur.104
Nationally, implementing the Regulation depends on the responsible authorities
designated by E.U. member states.105 These authorities should conduct ex-post
checks on how E.U. importers comply with the Regulation.106 This includes audits
of records as well as on-the-spot inspections.107 The Regulation has been criticized
for its lack of sanctions.108 Member states set the rules that apply to infringements
of the Regulation. When an infringement occurs, the competent authorities issue
a notice of remedial action to be undertaken by the company.109 Whether
compliance will be achieved without penalties for failure to take remedial action
remains to be seen.
The only example of a targeted HRDD law is the Dutch Child Labor Due
Diligence Act, which was approved by the Dutch Senate in 2019, and is yet to go
into effect.110 Like the French law, the Act brings together the HRDD and
transparency elements of the UNGP’s second pillar by pushing companies to
examine their supply chains for child labor, act upon their findings, and report
that they have done so. Specifically, the Act requires all companies that supply
goods or services to Dutch end-users to issue a declaration that HRDD is
conducted to prevent child labor from being used in the production of goods and
services.111 In order to make the requisite declaration, it is implicit that the
company must conduct the necessary HRDD. Should the HRDD give the
company a reasonable suspicion of child labor in the production of the company’s
goods or services, it must adopt and implement a plan of action to address this.
Once the obligation is in place, a new regulator [toezichthouder] will be created
that will publish the corporate human rights due diligence statements in an online

104

No definitive list of “conflict-affected” or “high-risk” countries has been published yet, and E.U.
importers are encouraged to make this assessment themselves based on non-binding guidelines
issued by the European Commission. See Commission Recommendation (EU) No. 2018/1149 of
10 Aug. 2018, 2018 O.J. (L 208) 94.

105

EUR. COMM’N, Conflict Minerals: List of Member State Competent Authorities Designated Under
Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/821 (Jan. 9, 2020).

106

See Regulation 2017/821, supra note 102, art. 10–11.
Sascha Arnold, The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation – New Due Diligence Requirements for Importers,
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP (June 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/44FH-VTPM.
John Williams, The Battle for Stronger EU Conflict Minerals Legislation, GLOBAL MINING REVIEW (Feb.
4, 2020, 11:25 AM), https://perma.cc/JDB2-KHBL.
See Regulation 2017/821, supra note 102, art. 16.

107

108

109
110

111

The expectation is that the Act will become effective sometime in 2022. The three-year period
between the Act’s approval and it going into effect would give the government time to prepare a
General Administrative Order that appoints the regulator and fleshes out the obligations of
companies under the Act in more detail, see Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Act Approved by Senate –
Implications for Global Companies, ROPES & GRAY (June 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/NS4E-BZZB.
Id.
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public registry.112 There will not be a formal list of companies that must comply
with the law, however, meaning that third parties cannot check if a company is
covered or not. Affected third parties such as victims cannot sue companies under
the Act, but they can submit complaints that may trigger enforcement by the
regulator.113 Any individual or entity wishing to submit a complaint must first
submit the complaint to the company itself. If the company’s reaction is
“inadequate” according to the complainant, and on the basis of concrete evidence
of non-compliance with the Act, a complaint can be filed with the regulator.114 A
company can be fined up to €8,200 for failing to submit a statement declaring that
it exercises due diligence.115 If a company fails to carry out due diligence in
accordance with the Act or to draw up a plan of action, or to comply with any
further requirements that are established pertaining to due diligence and the plan
of action, a fine of up to €870,000 or 10% of the worldwide annual turnover of
the company can be imposed.116 Thus, in terms of regulatory oversight, the Act
provides the most comprehensive oversight among the laws discussed. However,
the scheme still has gaps: in particular, the Dutch authorities will not actively
enforce the law except in response to a third-party complaint, meaning the law
relies on the watchdog role of civil society to ensure its effectiveness.117 We discuss
the problems with this approach in Section V.

112

Wet Zorgplicht Kinderarbeid 24 Oktober 2019 [Child Labor Duty of Care Act], Stb. 2019, 401
(2019) (Neth.); see Anneloes Hoff, Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law: A Step Towards Mandatory
Human Rights Due Diligence, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (June 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/TLY5-34GW.

113

See Anneloes Hoff, Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law: A Step Towards Mandatory Human Rights Due
Diligence, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (June 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/TLY5-34GW. Plaintiffs
under general Dutch tort law, nevertheless, would still be able to rely indirectly on the Act if the
violation of the Act by the company could be construed as an indication of an act contrary to a
duty of care to society. Where the compliance officer breaches their obligations, such as by a
violation of the implementation of a due diligence process that causes serious bodily harm, the
compliance officer themselves incur personal criminal liability. This can be punishment of a
maximum of two years’ imprisonment and a €20,500 fine. LISE SMIT ET AL., STUDY ON DUE
DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE SUPPLY CHAIN 211 (2020).
Child Labor Duty of Care Act, Stb. 2019, 401.
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ROPES & GRAY, supra note 110.
Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Laws: The Netherlands Led the Way in Addressing Child Labour and
Contemplates Broader Action, ALLEN & OVERY (Sept. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/49ME-QLU9.
Chiara Macchi & Claire Bright, Hardening Soft Law: The Implementation of Human Rights Due Diligence
Requirements in Domestic Legislation, in LEGAL SOURCES IN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: EVOLVING
DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 12 (M. Buscemi et al. eds., forthcoming 2020).
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IV. B ENEFITS OF T RANSPARENCY AND HRDD R EQUIREMENTS
TO C ORPORATE A CCOUNTABILITY FOR H UMAN R IGHTS
I MPACTS
Despite their shortcomings, which are discussed in later sections, the current
transparency and HRDD requirements do move the legal framework closer
toward bringing human rights standards to bear on corporate activities. The most
obvious positive impact is that these laws place human rights on the corporate
agenda at the highest levels of management for the covered businesses.118 Placing
an expectation on companies to consider at the board level and, ideally, engage in
the issues that external reporting and HRDD raise119 may influence internal
business decisions which produce adverse human rights impacts.120
Corporations may be prompted to monitor and change their own behavior,
as well as to push for change in supplier practices. The different degrees of
expectations placed on companies by different types of legislation will influence
the extent of the positive changes (if any) that may occur. Whereas a mandatory
HRDD law such as the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance may
achieve a greater commitment from the businesses covered and more substantial
change on the ground for those adversely impacted, a light-touch disclosure law,
such as the U.K. MSA, is less likely to bring a substantial change for the workers
and communities affected. 121
Human rights disclosures may reveal information that stakeholders could
not previously access, if at a minimum the disclosures include a description of
policies and processes. In other words, reporting on human rights impacts can
contribute to legal and non-legal accountability by providing shareholders and
other stakeholders with formal acknowledgement by the company of its human
rights risks, policies, and processes.122 In terms of enhancing legal accountability,
HRDD laws play a crucial role by expressly placing a legal duty on businesses to
prevent, mitigate, and remediate human rights impacts. Various enforcement and
liability measures reinforce these duties. As for disclosures, information disclosed
118
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Equality and Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Joint Human Rights Committee of
the U.K. Houses of Parliament, reported that in their consultations with businesses on the
transparency in supply chains clause “businesses told [them] that the Modern Slavery Act had
prompted their boards to discuss human rights issues.” WRITTEN EVIDENCE FROM THE EQUALITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HRB 0030 ¶ 7.1 (July 2016), https://perma.cc/K72T-VWW7.
CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, CORPORATE REPORTING AND COMPANY LAW 51 (2006).
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Eccles & Serafeim, supra note 12, at 3. For a discussion of how social disclosure can catalyze
internally driven changes in corporate behavior, see Park, supra note 50. For an analysis of the
shortcomings of the EU NFRD on affecting organizational change, see Buhmann, supra note 12, at
36–39.
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CORE COAL, supra note 5, at 6–7.
See generally Written Evidence Submitted From CORE, supra note 92, ¶ 6.
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in human rights reports can be relied on as evidence in litigation brought against
parent or lead companies by individuals harmed at subsidiary and supplier sites123
or by consumers misled by the company’s disclosures.124 Most recently, corporatesustainability reports have been relied on by the plaintiffs in Lungowe v. Vedanta in
England and Jabir v. KiK in Germany to demonstrate the existence of a prima facie
duty of care assumed by the parent or the lead company toward the communities
or workers harmed by the subsidiary or supplier’s activities.125
On the non-legal accountability side, the approach of a company to its
HRDD and reporting can inform stakeholder decisions in relation to the
company, including investment decisions, purchasing decisions of consumers and
customers, and employment decisions.126 It is expected that the stakeholders
informed by the human rights disclosures will put pressure on businesses to
improve their policies and practices. External agencies, such as international
finance institutions or government agencies, may scrutinize these reports if they
require evidence that companies have identified and managed human rights risks
as a condition of providing support to them. Such support could be the provision
of export credit, the granting of a procurement contract, or the loan of finance.127
CSOs have made use of the information in various ways that help the public and
policymakers see the shortcomings of the legislation but also highlight the
contrasts between a company’s statements on human rights and its actual
performance. The value of these developments should not be overstated,
however. The next Section discusses the inadequacies of the existing legal
frameworks for improving corporate accountability for adverse human rights
impacts.
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For more on this, see Rachel Chambers & Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis, The New EU Rules on Non-financial
Reporting: Potential Impacts on Access to Remedy?, 10 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 18 (2016).
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Id.
See Vedanta Resources v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 (appeal taken from Eng.); Sheldon Leader et
al., LEGAL OPINION ON ENGLISH COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES ON TORT - JABIR AND OTHERS V KIK
TEXTILIEN UND NON-FOOD GMBH (Dec. 7, 2015).
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Choudhury, supra note 31, at 207; see SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44.
See SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44. In the U.K., the MSA and other relevant legislation do not
require public procurement processes to consider company reports under the MSA, § 54. It has
been recommended by an independent review that the U.K. Government introduce standards to
exclude non-compliant companies from eligibility for public contracts. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015, supra note 93, ¶ 2.6.4.
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V. W EAKNESSES AND P ITFALLS OF THIS M O DE OF M ARKET LED A CCOUNTABILITY
A. Overview
Our analysis of the existing disclosure and HRDD laws in Section III
demonstrates that, despite the variation in the obligations imposed, they rely
predominantly or exclusively on the “market” to exercise checks and hold
businesses accountable for human rights impacts.128 This is not unusual as, at least
for corporate disclosures, the main objective is to empower market actors with
information. But when the disclosure rules themselves are not designed
effectively, the empowerment and accountability functions are hindered by
businesses’ lack of disclosure, inadequate disclosures, and misleading disclosures.
While HRDD laws represent a crucial step for improving corporate accountability
by imposing substantive obligations on businesses to identify, prevent, mitigate,
and remediate human rights impacts and to communicate these steps, they still
heavily rely on initiatives from stakeholders for oversight and enforcement.
Communication of the HRDD processes and outcomes to stakeholders via
corporate disclosures is a key tool for those stakeholders to understand and react
to the human rights performance of businesses. To effectively and meaningfully
exercise this role, stakeholders need the support of regulatory tools to ensure
completeness and accuracy of HRDD disclosures.
Studies have shown that disclosure laws have had very limited success in
improving human rights conditions for affected groups and improving
accountability for impacts.129 This is unsurprising if these laws fail to elevate
human rights and environmental impact considerations on the priorities list of the
corporate world driven primarily by increasing profits.130 We argue here that to
improve the accountability function of HRDD and reporting obligations, two
main weaknesses in the current rules need to be overcome. The first one relates
to the content of the reports and the information that should be or is disclosed
under the relevant legislation. According to benchmarking reports analyzing these
disclosures, the content of the disclosures remains largely limited to disclosure of
128

129
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See, e.g., HOME OFFICE, MODERN SLAVERY AND SUPPLY CHAINS CONSULTATION 1, 8, 13 (2015)
(“We believe that once it is made clear what activity major businesses are undertaking to ensure
slavery and human trafficking is not taking place in their supply chains or own business, pressure
from consumers, shareholders and campaigners and competition between businesses will
encourage those who have not taken effective steps to do so.” The document continues, “[i]nstead
of relying on heavy-handed regulation, this measure will encourage businesses to do the right thing,
by harnessing consumer and other stakeholder pressure, which will encourage and influence
businesses to do more.”).
See Rao & Bernaz, supra note 41; FOCUS ON LABOR EXPLOITATION (FLEX), SEEING THROUGH
TRANSPARENCY: MAKING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY WORK FOR WORKERS (2018).
Bartley, supra note 15, at 49, n.56.
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information on commitments and policies rather than disclosing concrete risks to
workers and communities and also the substantive steps taken to address them.131
This is particularly problematic when the reporting requirements are not
accompanied by a due diligence obligation. We join scholars who have argued that
the lack of a due diligence obligation preceding the disclosure places serious
limitations on the law’s promise to increase corporate accountability and
contribute to eradicating human rights abuses.132 Most disclosures have been
largely limited to descriptions of the company’s commitments and processes in
addressing human rights and modern slavery issues in their supply chains.133 Little
space, if any, is dedicated to issues of substance, such as the specific risks to
employees and communities identified within the company’s own business and its
supply chain, as well as references to the concrete steps they have taken to
eliminate those risks and remediate the grievances.134 More advanced reports
typically present case studies, the company’s declared approach and commitment
to tackling modern slavery or human rights issues, expectations from its suppliers,
links to a list of first tier suppliers, identification of the most salient risks, and the
plans, policies, programs, and procedures it has established to assess and address
the risks.135 The pattern of focus on procedures and policies resembles the audit
and certification processes that are widely employed by lead firms to regulate
labor, human rights, and environmental performance in their supply chains and
which typically focus on process rather than substance.136 Since audits and
certification processes have so far been the central tool used to deal with human
rights impacts in supply chains, it is unsurprising that most disclosures are limited
to process as well.
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See, e.g., Michelle Langlois, Human Rights Reporting: Are Companies Telling Investors What They Need to
Know?, SHIFT (May 2017), https://perma.cc/DEY5-GC4R.
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Justine Nolan & Gregory Bott, Global Supply Chains and Human Rights: Spotlight on Forced Labor and
Modern Slavery Practices, 24 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 44, 56 (2018); see also Nolan, supra note 5; GENEVIEVE
LEBARON & ELLIE GORE, POLICY BRIEF #1: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UK
POLICYMAKERS 4–5 (2018).
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An Ergon Associates study found that “most statements do not go further than general
commitments and broad indications of processes.” See ERGON, REPORTING ON MODERN SLAVERY:
THE CURRENT STATE OF DISCLOSURE—MAY 2016 1 (2016); ERGON, MODERN SLAVERY
REPORTING: IS THERE EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS? (2018). LeBaron and Rühmkorf’s study shows
that companies reporting on bribery under the U.K. Bribery Act are using much more firm and
clear language, while modern slavery reporting uses a weaker and aspirational language. LeBaron &
Rühmkorf, supra note 5, at 25; see also Langlois, supra note 131; CORE COAL., supra note 5, at 6.
ALLIANCE FOR CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY, 2018 RESEARCH REPORT 24 (2018).
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See, e.g., MARKS & SPENCER GROUP LLP, MODERN SLAVERY STATEMENT 2017/18 (May 2018).
BARTLEY, supra note 15, at 55. For a discussion of the duty of care of social auditors, see Tara Van
Ho & Carolijn Terwindt, Assessing the Duty of Care for Social Auditors, 27 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 379, 379–
401 (2019).
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The content of human rights disclosures can be strengthened by including a
HRDD obligation. As the HRDD framework proposed by the UNGPs clarifies,
the process should focus on the risks to the rights holders rather than focusing on
the risks to the business itself. The focus of the reports attached to the HRDD
processes should contain rights-holder oriented communication. But as we
discuss in the following sections of this Article, an HRDD obligation alone may
not enhance the usefulness of disclosures in terms of accountability. The analyses
of initial disclosures under the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance
demonstrate that, despite the improvements in disclosures, reporting remains
relatively immature.137 For those companies that have complied with the reporting
requirement, disclosures of policies and processes remains the key message. The
implementation of § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act also suggests that even with a
due diligence requirement, more is needed to make these laws effective in
achieving their aims.138 Many HRDD disclosures focus on commitments and
processes in the abstract, which fails to provide the kind of meaningful
information that stakeholders may rely on in making investment, purchasing, and
campaigning decisions about a particular company. This type of disclosure can
also easily transform into a publicity tool, painting a misleading picture of a
company’s human rights performance.139 More dangerously, it can mask and
legitimize serious abuses, especially when they report successes based on audits
and certification.140
This takes us to the second weakness in these laws, which is our focus in the
rest of this Article. The lack or inadequacy of mechanisms for formal oversight
and enforcement renders the role of the stakeholders, as guardians of
accountability, extremely challenging and thus undermines the accountability
objectives of these laws. It is hoped that the market forces alone will assume the
oversight function and produce the desired accountability outcomes without
having the support of appropriate regulatory tools in exercising this function. We
137

138

139

140

SHIFT, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING IN FRANCE: A BASELINE FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE
DUTY OF VIGILANCE LAW 44–45 (2018).
Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining a Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 431 (2015). In this
study Sarfaty finds that only about seven percent of companies report strong due diligence measures
in their 2014 reports prepared in order to comply with the regulation.
See ALLIANCE FOR CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY, 2019 RESEARCH REPORT 90 (2019). An analysis of
the sustainability reports of 1,000 companies pursuant to the E.U. NFRD Study found that “general
human rights reporting requirements are not an effective tool to ensure the disclosure of
information that can help to assess a company’s management of individual risks of human rights
impacts, and by extension of whether its business conduct is responsible.” Id.
Genevieve LeBaron & Jane Lister, Benchmarking Global Supply Chains: The Power of the ‘Ethical Audit’
Regime, 41 REV. INT’L STUD. 905, 906–07 (2015); GENEVIEVE LEBARON, THE GLOBAL BUSINESS
OF FORCED LABOR: REPORT OF FINDINGS 3 (2018) (“[C]ertification had little to no impact on labor
standards within the tea industry . . . [and] [s]ome of the worst cases of exploitation documented
within [their] research occurred on ethically certified plantations.”).
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argue here that even if the first weakness is overcome—as it has been in the
French law—without a formal verification, oversight, and enforcement process,
the utility of the disclosures to empower stakeholders to pressure for change will
be undermined. This results from: (1) the reliability of the disclosed information
remaining questionable; (2) stakeholders being left to search for a needle in a
haystack in the absence of formal lists of covered businesses and central public
repositories for reports; and (3) even where the inadequacy and the accuracy of
disclosures are well established, the lack of enforcement measures and sanctions
that can be triggered by stakeholders will weaken their leverage. The flaws of
content and oversight are closely linked, and for mandated disclosure to
contribute meaningfully to corporate accountability for adverse human rights
impacts, both must be addressed by the policy and law makers. In the remaining
sections of this Article, we engage in an in-depth discussion of oversight and
enforcement issues.

B. Market Oversight
Even when companies do fulfill their obligation to report on issues of
human rights and modern slavery, doubts remain as to the effectiveness of these
reports from an accountability point of view. Early empirical research indicates
that the legally mandated human rights and modern slavery disclosures are “quite
limited”141 and “more symbolic than substantive.”142 Some companies even appear
to copy each other’s explanations of their due diligence processes.143 These
practices of failing to comply or selective disclosures have reportedly been
unwelcome by certain businesses that want to see serious monitoring and
enforcement so as to level the playing field.144 The Ethical Trading Initiative, in a
submission to the U.K. Houses of Parliament Public Accounts Committee,
reported that a large majority of companies they have engaged with stated that it
is important for the Government to monitor compliance with section 54 of the

141

142

Rachel N. Birkey et al., Mandated Social Disclosure: An Analysis of the Response to the California Transparency
in Supply Chains Act of 2010, 152 J. BUS. ETHICS 827, 837 (2018).
Id.
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Steve Gibbons, What are Construction and Building Companies Reporting Under the Modern Slavery Act?,
LINKEDIN (Feb. 22 2017), https://perma.cc/33W6-WSY6; see also Hess, supra note 50, at 53
(examining human rights reporting and concluding that reports are “unbalanced, incomprehensive,
and inconsistent” and that reporting under CTSA and MSA “face[s] similar challenges”).

144

FLEX, supra note 129, at 20–22 (“One FLEX interview participant who is in favor of stronger
enforcement of the Act, said that he was concerned that penalties in isolation could result in
transparency reporting being a tick box exercise for many companies. He suggested that a penalty
for non-compliance should only be introduced in combination with expectations or requirements
on the content of statements as many statements otherwise are unlikely to provide meaningful
information.”).
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Modern Slavery Act and that the Act could not be effective without such
monitoring.145
We saw in Section III above that the reporting and HRDD laws analyzed in
this Article take varying approaches to the regulation of oversight and
enforcement. The common rationale behind each law is to empower key
stakeholders, such as investors, consumers, and civil society, with information that
will enable them to bring human rights standards to bear on corporate
misconduct. In this respect, these stakeholders can play a crucial role of oversight
and enforcement by making effective use of the information disclosed through
these reports. In other words, the stakeholders will take notice of businesses that
fail to report, or report inadequately, and will penalize them by not purchasing
products, divesting or not investing, or by running campaigns to raise awareness
about the businesses’ failure.146 These market interventions can, in their most
legalized form, include consumer suits for misleading disclosures or advertising.
The thinking is that these market pressures will result in companies improving
their practices and processes on human rights and modern slavery risks in their
supply chains.
There are a few overly optimistic assumptions here and this approach has
been challenged already from several angles, particularly with respect to the scale
of the desired transformative impact of human rights reports on consumer
behavior.147 Marcia Narine argues that company human rights disclosures,
including on modern slavery, are not always widely disseminated or known and
that stakeholders who do know about them do not use the information they
contain adequately to press for corporate reform.148 She concludes that evidence
of consumer behavior changing as a result of such disclosure is “inconsistent, at
best.”149 Narine’s reasoning would also apply to HRDD related disclosures. Her
viewpoint aligns with a study of human rights disclosure conducted by Adam
Chilton and Galit Sarfaty, which found that consumers perceived non-compliant
or inadequate supply chain disclosures in the same way as they did detailed
disclosures showing a high level of due diligence.150 Their study suggests that
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Cindy Berman, Written Evidence From the Ethical Trading Initiative (2018), https://perma.cc/75GRGQKJ.
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Responding to Modern Slavery – New UK Benchmarking Report, supra note 36.
See Marcia Narine, Disclosing Disclosure’s Defects: Addressing Corporate Irresponsibility for Human Rights
Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 84 (2015); Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 14.
See Narine, supra note 147.
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“supply chain disclosures are unlikely to be understood and used by consumers
making purchasing decisions.”151
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the impact HRDD and
disclosure will have on the transformation of corporate behavior if they heavily or
solely rely on a market-based enforcement model. Consumer and investor
perceptions might change the longer these rules are in force, or as the ability of
CSOs to raise public awareness of HRDD and reports increases, thus elevating
their impact.152 But we advance two arguments as to why this will not overcome
the limitations of the impact HRDD and disclosure laws can have on improving
business behavior. First, the passage of time alone will not overcome the
weaknesses relating to the content of the reports discussed in the previous Section.
Second, as we argue in this Article, improving content requirements alone will also
not suffice to achieve the optimal accountability and transformation objectives
envisaged by these disclosure laws. Chilton and Sarfaty identify the limitations of
reliance on consumers as influencers in this area. They note that corporate
disclosures are generally not sufficiently effective, but that they are less likely to
produce meaningful outcomes in this particular area. This is because the
information communicated to the consumer relates to processes used in the
making of the product and not to its characteristics. They argue that consumers
might not be willing to change their purchasing decisions based merely on process
if all other qualities of the product are the same.153 Their reasoning here would
also apply to HRDD disclosures. The other obstacle they observe is the difficulty
in interpreting the contents of the disclosure. For instance, MSA reports merely
present the processes a company is using to try to tackle modern slavery in their
supply chain, but do not report the incidences of modern slavery and how the
company has responded to them. Also, companies will face different risks
depending on variables like sector, business model, or location of sourcing. It is
very unlikely that consumers will be able to interpret the contribution of these
factors to eradicate modern slavery.
Another important reality to note is that even where awareness is high and
there is a sustained reaction against a business because of its performance in this
area, this can only cover businesses and brands that are consumer facing.154 This
leaves many large businesses operating in industries, such as mining, construction,
shipping, or defense, outside one of the main radars of the transparency
151

Id. Chilton and Sarfaty do note that the study had several limitations, like the fact that these
reporting requirements are new.
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Narine, supra note 147, at 40.
Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 14, at 23; FLEX, supra note 129, at 20–21 (“[O]ne company
representative [interviewed] suggested the idea that consumers are going to challenge companies
for failure to comply with the Act or for publishing statements of poor quality is flawed, saying
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Berman, supra note 145.
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legislation. These businesses may still be on the CSO or investor radar, but it may
be harder for CSOs to garner public interest to a campaign against a nonconsumer facing company, and some investors might place less importance on
reputational risk posed to a business that is non-consumer facing.
In view of these hurdles for consumers, it is more likely that the greatest
pressure on businesses to improve their human rights performance will come
from CSOs and investors rather than from consumers. Interested CSOs and
investors scrutinize human rights and modern slavery disclosures actively.155 CSOs
publish their analyses of these reports, highlighting the levels of compliance as
well as the weak and notable practices.156 They also invite companies to respond
to allegations of human rights abuses in their supply chains, informally or as part
of a process established in law—such as the process available under the French
Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance.157 The information contained, or the
lack of information, in a human rights or modern slavery statement can shine the
spotlight on the policies and performance of the reporting companies. Similarly,
investors can raise concerns and questions with businesses in which they are
investing during annual meetings or directly with management.158 Investors might
also take into consideration the human rights record of a business or its efforts to
eliminate modern slavery in its supply chain when making their investment or
divestment decisions.159 Both groups of stakeholders can also engage with policy
makers to increase efforts to eliminate modern slavery, if they find the legislative
framework inadequate. Recently, the CEO and two senior executives resigned
from Rio Tinto after reported investor pressure prompted by the company’s
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In fact, it has been observed that “due to insufficient regulation, a large burden lies with the
international civil society which, in various ways, monitors the functionality of transnational
corporations.” Jernej Letnar Černič, Moving Towards Protecting Human Rights in Global Business Supply
Chains, 36 B.U. INT’L L.J. 101, 109 (2018); see also, Join the Alliance, INVESTOR ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INITIATIVE OF ICCR, https://perma.cc/BMD5-6DJR.
See, e.g., CORE ET AL., MODERN SLAVERY REPORTING: WEAK AND NOTABLE PRACTICE (2017);
CORE COAL., supra note 5.
See Brabant & Savourey, supra note 61; Savourey, supra note 65; Cossart et al., supra note 66; CHLOE
STEVENSON ET AL., THE LAW ON DUTY OF VIGILANCE OF PARENTS AND OUTSOURCING
COMPANIES (Juliette Renauld et al. eds., 2019). NGOs make allegations to the company in the first
instance and may elevate their concerns to the court if the company does not respond adequately.
See CORE ET AL., ENGAGING WITH COMPANIES ON MODERN SLAVERY – A BRIEFING FOR
INVESTORS (2017).
For instance, investment fund BlackRock divested from Nevsun Resources Ltd. because of the
allegations that the latter uses forced labor in its Eritrean mining operations, after receiving pressure
from NGOs. See Campaigners Welcome Blackrock’s Divestment from Nevsun Following Campaign Over Alleged
Use of Forced Labor in Eritrea, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE,
https://perma.cc/4PPX-APFQ.

352

Vol. 21 No. 2

Human Rights Disclosure and Due Diligence Laws

Chambers & Vastardis

decision to blow up a 46,000-year-old aboriginal site in Australia.160 It is yet to be
seen how far the company will go to affect structural change in preventing adverse
human rights impacts caused by its business. While public relations scandals, such
as this recent one involving Rio Tinto, can lead to short-term positive changes
within certain parts of a company’s business, it is important to continue keeping
companies accountable beyond large scandals to trigger structural
improvements.161 Regulatory oversight and enforcement of disclosures and
HRDD are among the essential ingredients of such a structural change.
The amount, accuracy, and type of information presented in the reports or,
in many cases, the lack of reporting, place a substantial limit on the contribution
of investors and CSOs to improving corporate accountability in this area.162
Businesses are required to disclose very little to comply with the reporting
requirements, and under some of the laws, this includes the option of disclosing
lack of action in this area. The disclosures, even the most detailed ones available,
mainly focus on process and contain little information on concrete problems. It
is difficult for an investor or a CSO to extract actionable information from these
disclosures on a company’s actual human rights performance. These factors
significantly limit these stakeholders’ ability to use the disclosures to hold
businesses accountable for human rights violations in their supply chains. With
only a very small number of CSOs monitoring the legislation, it is unreasonable
for policy makers to expect civil society actors with limited resources to drive the
push toward business compliance with the transparency laws without any serious
regulatory support.163
One of the only means of private legal action challenging the accuracy of
human rights disclosure is consumer litigation. When activist consumers sue
companies, this has the potential to send a powerful message.164 The cause of
action could be a suit under consumer protection law or some other statutory
prohibition on misrepresentation, unfair competition, or false advertising, thereby
challenging the accuracy or adequacy of the disclosure and arguing that consumers
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See Ben Butler, Lorena Allam & Calla Wahlquist, Rio Tinto CEO and Senior Executives Resign From
Company After Juukan Gorge Debacle, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/X8UDEQRG.
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international human rights standards even in the absence of home or host state willingness to do
so and the limitations of this approach, see Jay Butler, The Corporate Keepers of International Law, 114
AM. J. INT’L L. 189–220 (2020).
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were ill informed or misled when purchasing products, causing them harm.165 The
disclosure that is challenged through this litigation has in some instances been
made pursuant to one of the laws discussed in this Article, but many of these cases
concern product information from labels or other product literature.166 On the
whole, the impact of these lawsuits has been quite limited so far. A series of cases
brought against companies in California alleging inadequate and/or misleading
disclosure of documented modern slavery in their supply chains were rejected by
the courts.167 There is a concern that, even if these cases were successful,
companies would make changes to their labels and product literature, rather than
seek to improve conditions for workers in their supply chains.168 Damages are
complicated to calculate in this type of case because it is hard to value the loss to
the plaintiffs, when the harm they have suffered is that they would not have
bought the products if they had known about the use of child and forced labor in
the supply chain. The lack of success in claims to date has not prevented new
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For a full list of cases, see note 167. There have been similar cases outside the U.S. In Germany, a
successful complaint was filed against German retailer Lidl in 2010 for false advertising and unfair
competition arising from the retailer’s claims of fair working conditions in its supply chain.
Following the complaint, Lidl agreed to retract the claims made in its marketing material on working
conditions in its supply chain. Although this was a successful outcome of the litigation, and it had
an impact on the company’s public statements on these issues, it is not possible to determine
whether it had any substantive impact on the company’s sourcing policies or practices. See Complaint
re Fair Working Conditions in Bangladesh: Lidl Forced to Back Down, ECCHR, https://perma.cc/RX3GVPUZ. This complaint did not relate to disclosure made under modern slavery legislation but rather
to statements on its supply chain that the company made voluntarily.
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representations that Nike had made about working conditions in its supply chain. A settlement was
agreed for $1.5 million and involved investments by Nike to strengthen workplace monitoring and
factory worker programs.
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See Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 15-CV-03783-JSW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5524 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 15, 2016) (dismissing case for lack of standing); Barber v. Nestle, 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 (9th Cir.
2018) (dismissing plaintiffs’ false advertising and unfair competition claims on the grounds that the
CTSCA creates a safe harbor from liability by defining what a company is required to disclose
regarding the use of forced labor in its supply chain, and dismissing plaintiffs’ misrepresentation
claim, finding that the statements about supplier adherence to law and industry standards were
“aspirational”); Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing the case and finding
that Mars does not have a duty to disclose forced labor in its supply chain because it is not a physical
defect that affects the central function of the chocolate products); see also Tomasella v. Nestlé USA,
Inc., 962 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2020); Tomasella v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2019),
aff’d, 962 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2020); Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 18-CV-10360-ADB, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14488 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2019) (dismissing the case because the consumers’ claims
were not actionable under Massachusetts law and they failed to show that the companies deceived
them).
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See Complaint re Fair Working Conditions in Bangladesh: Lidl Forced to Back Down, supra note 165. The
consumer complaint against the retailer Lidl regarding its advertising campaign claiming fair
working conditions in its supply chain led to the company withdrawing the advertisements, rather
than the company being compelled to take steps to ensure fair working conditions.
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cases being brought, however.169 Thus, consumer litigation has the potential to
provide enforcement of reporting accuracy and adequacy but in an ancillary role
compared to other types of enforcement.

VI. T HE I MPORTANCE OF R EGULATORY O VERSIGHT AND THE
I NSTITUTIONAL O PTIONS
We argue in this Article that to achieve their stated accountability goals,
human rights due diligence and disclosure requirements should be accompanied
by rules establishing: (1) a formal list of businesses covered by the requirements
and a publicly accessible repository for storing annual disclosures; (2) an
institutional structure to exercise oversight; and (3) enforcement functions. The
institutional structure should have subject matter expertise, in order to provide
training and guidelines to ensure accuracy and completeness of disclosures.170
Without these features accompanying the disclosure requirements, stakeholders’
ability to make effective use of the information disclosed becomes significantly
diminished. The presence of an oversight body with the powers to check accuracy
and completeness and impose sanctions for misleading and incomplete
disclosures will allow the stakeholders targeted by the transparency rules to
exercise their leverage more systematically and effectively.
Admittedly, it may be a huge task for a regulatory body to scrutinize all
submitted reports, especially as the number of covered companies grows, but the
body could routinely review a random sample each financial year and be prompted
by investors, consumers, and civil society to carry out additional reviews or
investigations. Stakeholders should have standing to initiate complaints regarding
suspected discrepancies and inaccuracies in reports to an expert body, equipped
with legal authority and sufficient resources, that can investigate the accuracy or
adequacy of the information; if needed, compel the business to correct and
complement the disclosure; and impose penalties for failure to comply. In this
approach, stakeholders—equipped with and empowered by the regulatory tools
and the institutional infrastructure to exercise their watchdog role more
effectively—continue to play a key role in holding businesses accountable. This
169

Walker v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-723-L-BGS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106858 (S.D. Cal.
June 17, 2020); Myers v. Starbucks Corp., 5:20-CV-00335-CBM-SHK (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2020).
Both cases allege affirmative misrepresentation by the defendant companies in relation to
statements made on product labels and literature that cocoa is “sustainably sourced,” “certified,”
and “supports” or “helps” farmers. They rely on allegations of child and forced labor in the cocoa
farms and of environmental destruction, as part of clearing the land for farms, to evidence that
these statements are misrepresentations.

170

We are not alone in concluding that verification and oversight are needed. Doorey, for instance, in
an article on using domestic disclosure to influence foreign labor practices, argues that the
information needs to be verified by the state (and/or a credible outside auditor). See Doorey, supra
note 30.
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way, the role of oversight is not entirely or largely left to the voluntary efforts of
investors and CSOs whose abilities to push for compliance can be limited by
several factors, such as scarce financial and human resources, lack of authority to
compel further disclosures, and inability to impose financial penalties. At the same
time, the oversight role would not be left exclusively to the regulatory authorities.
Stakeholders would continue to play a crucial role in the accountability framework
from a strengthened position both by having access to a centralized list and a
repository and, more importantly, by having standing to bring complaints before
a body with powers to investigate and impose penalties.

A. Key Functions of Meaningful Regulatory Oversight
Among the HRDD and transparency laws discussed in this Article, the
regulatory oversight feature remains either inadequate or non-existent. Even the
French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance—with its advanced
accountability features providing legal standing for civil society before courts to
bring actions to enforce the duty to publish an adequate vigilance plan—lacks a
regulatory body to exercise oversight over the law’s implementation and to hold a
central list and repository, thus leaving the challenging and resource-intensive
monitoring function almost exclusively to stakeholders. Taking stock of the initial
experiences with the transparency laws discussed in the earlier sections of this
Article and most recently with the French Law on the Corporate Duty of
Vigilance, we argue that all of the elements elaborated below are needed to achieve
greater level of accountability via transparency and HRDD laws.

1. List and Repository
CSOs have expressed concern about the lack of information regarding
companies covered by various HRDD and reporting laws currently in force.171 It
is often left to their investigative skills to identify which companies may be
covered by disclosure requirements and confirm whether covered companies have
published disclosures. Having an annually-updated, formal list of companies
covered by human rights disclosure requirements provides the stakeholders and
the regulator with an essential tool for identifying which companies have complied
with the most basic obligation under these laws. A central repository accessible by
the public to store annual disclosures will allow stakeholders more efficient access
both to the most recent reports and all the other years since the introduction of
the relevant laws.
As discussed in Section III, some disclosure laws already provide for a list
and/or a repository, such as the Australian MSA. For the disclosure laws that fail
to provide for the establishment of a formal list and a central repository for
171

See, e.g., Savourey, supra note 65.
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reports, there have been calls for governments to introduce these safeguards (for
example, the U.K. MSA) to improve the effectiveness of these laws.172 In
agreement with these calls, we argue that the establishment of a formal list and a
repository to be an essential ingredient for improving the accountability mission
of HRDD and disclosure laws.

2. Monitoring Function and the Content of Reports
The added value brought by having a regulator with monitoring
responsibility is in ensuring submissions are made in a timely fashion and in
exercising checks on the content of an appropriate size sample each year. These
sample checks can ensure coverage of all required elements and accuracy
disclosures. As we discussed above in Section V, the existing HRDD and
disclosure laws rely primarily on stakeholders to monitor business performance
and compliance with the applicable law’s requirements. Even the most evolved
statutory regime, the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance, does not
establish regulatory oversight and relies on stakeholders to monitor whether
covered businesses have developed and published an adequate vigilance plan. The
enforcement and sanctions mechanisms of the French law (discussed in Section
III) depend solely on the stakeholders identifying the lack of compliance with the
law or the misleading statements within published plans and triggering the relevant
court processes stipulated in the law. We will return to the subject of stakeholders
raising complaints as a trigger for regulator action below, but first we address the
primary source of monitoring currently in place in this legislative field, namely the
monitoring of non-financial disclosure.173 Auditors usually monitor non-financial
disclosure, as the complement to financial disclosure, in the first instance, with
financial regulators holding a further oversight function. The level of monitoring
provided by the financial regulator varies from state to state.
In some countries, limited oversight of human rights disclosures is exercised
by accounting or securities regulators such as the U.K. Financial Reporting
Council (FRC) and the U.S. SEC. For instance, the SEC enforces liability for any
false or misleading statements under Dodd Frank § 1502. The Trump
Administration opposed § 1502 and made a proposal to repeal it.174 Verification
and enforcement were stepped down.175 Whether coincidentally or as a result of
these developments, there is very little verification and enforcement of this law
172
173

174

175

Independent Review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, supra note 93.
The other potential source of monitoring under existing legal regimes is the US securities regulator,
the SEC. In theory at least, the SEC enforces liability for any false or misleading statements under
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 1502, 111 P.L. 203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
Ed Pilkington, Proposed Trump Executive Order Would Allow US Firms to Sell ‘Conflict Minerals’, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/CF63-C6YL.
RESPONSIBLE SOURCING NETWORK, supra note 101, at 4, 9.
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that has occurred in practice. The appropriateness of the SEC as a regulator on
corporate social impacts is debated.176 The current civil society effort in the U.S.
to push for a new corporate transparency law on social and environmental impacts
is focused on publicly listed companies—its press statement arguing that “the
SEC is the right agency, given its expertise in corporate disclosures, and broad
mandate to protect investors and the public interest.”177 On the other hand, the
ability of the SEC to be a “humanitarian watchdog” has been questioned, due to
the organization’s lack of specialist knowledge.178
The E.U. NFRD, which has been transposed into the law of E.U. Member
States, provides a sample of instances on the monitoring of human rights
disclosures. Eight states require that disclosure under the NFRD forms part of
the company’s management report.179 The allocation of the human rights report
within the management report allows for a basic level of auditor scrutiny over the
content of the report, as the E.U. Accounting Directive requires that an auditor
check the entire management report to verify its consistency with the financial
statements and its compliance with legal requirements and also to check for the
presence of material misstatements.180
For a verification of a human rights report, there is not much to be gained
by consistency checks with financial statements. Compliance with legal
requirements is also easily verifiable as the legal requirements for human rights
reporting are minimal and relatively vague. Only the checks for material
misstatements could prove useful in the human rights reporting context, but such
checks will require expertise and access to information that may exist either within
the company as well as beyond the company, and often beyond the country. Four
states require verification of information beyond checks for consistency with the
management report.181 In Denmark, for instance, the implementing legislation
envisages a regulatory review of ten to twenty percent of listed companies that are
selected for full scope enforcement each year, checking presence and content of

176

See generally Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325 (2012).

177

International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, Corporate Human Rights Risk Assessment,
Prevention, and Mitigation Act of 2019 2 (June 10, 2019). On the SEC as a regulatory of human
rights issues, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97 (2013).
See Woody supra note 176.

178
179

GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 16, 17, 19, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31. (Belgium, Bulgaria,
Denmark, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, U.K., and Iceland).

180

Council Directive 2013/34/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19, art. 53 (mandating that Member States
implement the new directive by July 20, 2015).

181

GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 19, 20, 23, 26 (Denmark, France, Italy, and the
Netherlands).
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statements.182 The enforcement approach is based on the materiality of the
disclosed information. Material misstatements may result in the imposition of
fines in accordance with the Danish Financial Statements Act.183
The experience with the human rights transparency laws to date shows that
the unique features of human rights reporting call for a sui generis approach to
oversight and enforcement. As with financial reporting, the rules on the required
information and the oversight and enforcement related to the completeness and
accuracy of the content disclosed may be designed around the concept of
“materiality,” but the meaning of “materiality” in a human rights context is unclear
in the existing reporting regulations.184 Materiality has been viewed as a misleading
concept in the human rights context, and instead the use of “salient risks” has
been proposed by the UNGP Reporting Framework.185 Companies are typically
required to disclose material information in non-financial reports including human
rights disclosures. The E.U. Accounting Directive, for instance, describes material
information as “the status of information where its omission or misstatement
could reasonably be expected to influence decisions that users make on the basis
of the financial statements of the undertaking. The materiality of individual items
shall be assessed in the context of other similar items.”186 For non-financial
statements, the E.U. NFRD adds that the required disclosures shall contain
information “to the extent necessary for an understanding of the . . . impact of
[the company’s] activity.”187 The NFRD recognizes that in determining materiality,
the context in which the business is operating needs to be taken into account.
Recital 8 of the Directive states that the information disclosed should cover
“principal risks of severe impacts,” which will be assessed by the scale and gravity
of impact. One study points out that this standard introduces a different approach
to materiality by focusing on the “scale and gravity of the materialization of the
risk, rather than whether knowledge of a principal risk would influence readers’

182

See generally Forslag Til Lov om Ændring af Årsregnskabsloven og Forskellige Andre Love [Act
Amending the Danish Financial Statements Act], LOV nr 738 af 01/06/2015 (2015); GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 56, at 19.

183

See generally Bekendtgørelse af Årsregnskabsloven [Danish Financial Statements Act] LBK nr 838 af
08/08/2019 (2019).

184

Note the difference here between due diligence and reporting obligations. The due diligence laws
are not framed in terms of materiality, but for instance, the French Law requires companies to
detect risks and prevent serious violations with respect to human rights (the threshold is “serious”).
See SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44.

185
186
187

Council Directive 2013/34/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19, art. 2(16).
Council Directive 2014/95/EU, 2014 O.J. (L. 330) 1, art. 1(1).
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economic decisions.”188 The approach fleshed out in the Recital 8 does align with
the conception of “salient risk” embedded in the Pillar Two of the UNGPs.189
In a shift away from the usual investor-risk rationale for non-financial
reporting, UNGP Pillar Two focuses on risks to rights-holders, and the
importance of taking into account the perspectives of those who may be directly
affected by companies’ actions. One study notes that this aspect of the
“materiality” concept has not been reflected in the Member State implementing
legislation covered in the study, however.190 A guidance published by the U.K.’s
FRC on the non-financial reporting, for instance, emphasizes materiality for
investors, thus following the classic shareholder-centric understanding of
materiality in the reporting context.191 But such an understanding of materiality
for human rights reports does not align with the understanding of risk under the
UNGPs, which are instead centered around the affected individuals and
communities. We argue here that human rights disclosure laws should impose
mandatory minimum content, covering salient human rights risks posed to
individuals and communities affected by the activity of the business and the steps
taken to prevent, mitigate, and remediate impacts.192
In assessing the completeness of human rights disclosures, auditors and
regulatory bodies will have to determine which human rights issues relating to a
company’s business can be categorized as salient. The size and geographical
spread of a covered company’s business is likely to render checking the
completeness of the disclosure challenging due to external information covering
each overseas or domestic subsidiary or supplier’s human rights impact not being
readily available to the external auditors and the regulatory bodies.193 The
distinction between this type of reporting and reporting on diversity and
governance is apparent here: diversity and governance reports are more amenable
to verification by domestic regulatory bodies because they are driven by
quantitative data, meaning they are more easily fact checked. Local and
international CSOs and inter-governmental bodies, such as the International
Labor Organization, can play a supportive role here. They are aware of businessrelated human rights impacts on the ground, and their documentation of impacts
188

189
190
191

192
193

CLAIRE JEFFREY ET AL., COMPARING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU NON-FINANCIAL
REPORTING DIRECTIVE IN THE UK, GERMANY, FRANCE, AND ITALY 5 (2017).
SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44, at 48–51 (explaining salient risk).
JEFFREY ET AL., supra note 188, at 4.
FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON THE STRATEGIC REPORT
https://perma.cc/5E4K-W338.
See SHIFT & MAZARS LLP, supra note 44, at 48–51 (explaining salience in this context).

(2018),

There are also restrictions under international law on extraterritorial verification and enforcement.
As Doorey reminds us, “Canada obviously cannot send inspectors to examine workplaces in
Bangladesh to verify the accuracy of the information provided by MNCs.” Doorey, supra note 30,
at 385.
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can at least help regulators raise red flags for problematic areas that may prompt
a more detailed investigation. The dichotomy in approaches to human rights
reporting identified in this Section highlights the need for a state-based approach
to monitoring and enforcement for human rights disclosures that marries human
rights with business and accounting expertise.
Civil society and investor groups can alert the regulators and other relevant
authorities of suspected false or misleading statements or to omissions of salient
risks from reports. The effectiveness of the existing procedures is variable. As
noted above, the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance allows any
person with legitimate interest to give official notice to the company to comply
with the law. If the company does not comply within three months of the notice,
a judge could oblige the company to publish a plan, under financial penalty if
necessary. The judge would also rule on whether a vigilance plan is complete and
appropriately fulfills the obligations described in the law. But much of the heavy
work of identifying and locating vigilance plans and identifying and investigating
their inadequacies falls to the civil society actors. Under the Dutch Child Labor
Law, any stakeholder with concrete evidence that a company’s goods or services
were produced with child labor will be able to submit a complaint to that
company. If the issue is not resolved, the stakeholder will be able to submit the
complaint to a regulator. Once a complaint is filed, the regulator may issue a legally
binding instruction ordering the company to conduct the required due diligence
and make the appropriate declaration. Again, the process of monitoring is very
much stakeholder led. Even without specific power contained within the
disclosure law, a regulator can invite and welcome complaints from external
parties such as CSOs, as the Attorney General of California has with respect to
CTSCA. As discussed above in Section III, this has not proven an effective means
of oversight and enforcement. Reports from external parties are also used as part
of the operating procedure for regulators reviewing companies’ non-financial
reports, such as the FRC in the U.K., which accepts complaints and reviews
reports on the basis of these.194 The FRC’s procedures are fairly limited in their
effectiveness, however, as the discussion that follows in next Section illustrates.

194

FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE CONDUCT COMMITTEE: OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR
REVIEWING CORPORATE REPORTING (2017). For information about making a complaint to the
FRC or raising a whistleblowing concern, see Whistleblowing, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL
https://perma.cc/Y2GF-WK9Q. The U.K. implemented the E.U. NFRD in the Companies,
Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Non-Financial Reporting) Regulations 2016, which added
§ 414CB to the Companies Act 2006. On March 11, 2019, the Business Secretary announced that
the FRC will be abolished and replaced by a new regulator, the Audit, Reporting and Governance
Authority. Audit Regime in the UK to Be Transformed with New Regulator, GOV.UK (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/R8DG-8UBX.
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3. Enforcement Function
The added value brought by having a regulator with enforcement
responsibility is the investigation of instances of alleged noncompliance and the
imposition of sanctions and penalties when noncompliance is found. On the other
hand, sanctions for noncompliance are not the hallmark of transparency
provisions but do feature in the two due diligence laws.195 Although the French
Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance is relatively new, the enforcement
mechanism was triggered for the first time in 2019 and has now been used in five
instances, with two cases so far having reached a court.196 There is yet to be a
substantive judgment on whether a company has breached its duty of vigilance,
however, because the question of which court is competent is still being litigated;
this nonetheless represents a significant departure from the status quo of minimal,
if any, enforcement under the other laws discussed.197
Most transparency laws discussed in this Article lack an effective
enforcement mechanism for noncompliance. Efforts have been made to seek
sanctions for noncompliance with human rights reporting requirements placed on
certain large or listed companies under U.K. law. In one instance, CSO
ClientEarth referred mining company, Rio Tinto, to the relevant regulator, the
FRC, for failing to report the reality of the company’s environmental and social
impacts.198 The regulator found that Rio Tinto had failed to make material
disclosures about serious environmental, employee, social, and community issues
at a mine site in Indonesia.199 Following this finding, Rio Tinto’s directors included
more information, as advised by the FRC, in their report and accounts for the
following year, and the regulator closed its inquiry. No other sanction was

195

Loi 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 Relative au Devoir de Vigilance des Sociétés Mères et des
Entreprises Donneuses D’Ordre (1) [LAW No. 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 on the Duty of
Vigilance of Parent Companies and Ordering Companies] Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 28, 2017; Child Labor Duty of Care Act, Stb.
2019, 401.

196

The two cases are against oil company Total. See Total Lawsuit (re Failure to Respect French Duty of
Vigilance Law in Operations in Uganda), BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE,
https://perma.cc/2XFJ-L2ZG.
Id.

197
198
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The complaint concerned, in particular, the group’s non-managed Grasberg mine in Indonesia. The
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund had divested from Rio Tinto on account of “severe
environmental damage” at Grasberg. The mine had been subject to bombings and other attacks
from local resistance groups, and the mine operators continued to pay for mine security provided
by the Indonesian military, despite the military’s history of human rights violations in Papua New
Guinea. See CLIENTEARTH, REFERRAL TO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING REVIEW PANEL, RE: THE RIO
TINTO GROUP ANNUAL REPORT 2008 (2010); see also Charlotte Villiers, Narrative Reporting and
Shareholder Value, in DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 120–126 (Joan Loughrey ed., 2012).
CLIENTEARTH, supra note 198.
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applied.200 There is power under the Companies Act 2006 for the regulator to
apply to court for a declaration that the annual reports of a company do not
comply with the relevant requirements and for an order requiring directors of the
company to prepare revised accounts. However, this power has never been
used.201 This case is illustrative of the role adopted by regulators thus far with
respect to human rights reporting: accepting complaints, reviewing reports, but
using sanctions as very much a last resort. To avoid situations of ineffective
enforcement, we envisage the introduction of sanctions and penalties prescribed
by the transparency or HRDD regulations that have to be imposed by the
regulator in accordance with established law and not on a discretionary basis. A
further added value of having a regulator with the power to impose sanctions and
penalties for noncompliance is the possibility of channeling financial penalties
applied to a fund that can be used as a contribution to reparations to individuals
or communities affected adversely by the acts and omissions of the penalized
corporation.202

B. Institutional Options and Subject Matter Exp ertise
With political will and support, a regulator can be empowered and resourced
to acquire subject matter expertise on human rights and also business and
accounting. A regulator staffed with appropriate experts and supported by
sufficient resources would develop greater expertise over time to establish
indicators on human rights risks on a sectoral and geographical basis. This
knowledge would enable the regulator to evaluate corporate disclosure and due
diligence to determine whether it reflects the salient risks to human rights from
the company’s operations.203 In this respect, the regulatory body is not expected
to penalize companies for human rights violations in their supply chains directly.
Rather, it would focus on the company’s compliance with the HRDD and
disclosure standards. The regulator would not evaluate the substance of a human
rights claim against the company, nor apply international human rights standards
to determine a violation of such standards. For instance, the regulator would have
200

Statement by the Financial Reporting Review Panel in Respect of the Report and Accounts of Rio
Tinto Plc, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/VFE5-DP3Z.

201

Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 456 (U.K.); FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, ANNUAL REVIEW OF
CORPORATE REPORTING 2018/2019 6 (2019).

202

The fund envisaged here is different than the reparation orders made by U.K. courts under the
MSA §§ 8–9. In a similar vein, in June 2018 the relevant U.K. authorities established the “General
Principles to compensate overseas victims (including affected States) in bribery, corruption and
economic crime cases,” a common framework set up “to identify cases where compensation is
appropriate and act swiftly in those cases to return funds to the affected countries, companies or
people.” See New Joint Principles Published to Compensate Victims of Economic Crime Overseas, SERIOUS
FRAUD OFFICE (June 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/BQ4X-Y5JD.
JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., supra note 5.
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the power to inspect whether a lead company has adequately disclosed the human
rights risks that are present in its supplier factories and the HRDD steps it has
taken to prevent, mitigate, and remediate any impacts. The regulator can sanction
the lead company, if it is satisfied that either the disclosed information does not
adequately capture the risks present and the steps taken or that the information is
misleading or inaccurate.
In terms of understanding risk, the U.S. Department of Labor commissions
an annual child labor report known as “Sweat and Toil.”204 These are detailed
reports of instances of child labor around the world and the gravity of each case.
This subject matter expertise, if held by regulators of corporate HRDD and
disclosure, would serve to enhance the ability of stakeholders to verify the content
of company reports and would also provide information for companies to
consider when they assess human rights and modern slavery risks. An additional
function of the regulator could be disseminating this information and developing
guidelines for businesses and other stakeholders.
We see slow movement in this direction. For instance, proposals made so
far to improve the MSA disclosures from an oversight perspective include
provision for a government funded central repository for published statements;205
for the government to publish a list of companies that must report under the
Transparency in Supply Chains clause of the Act;206 and for the establishment of
an independent review of modern slavery statements made by companies.207 The
last of these is the crucial piece, according to our argument for regulatory
oversight. Whether through an enhanced role for the Anti-Slavery Commissioner,
or through the creation of the sui generis body we recommend, independent review
is a necessary step toward the accountability goal of the legislation. As noted
above, there is a proposal currently under consideration in France for additional
state oversight for the Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance. Rather than taking
the form of a regulator, this would entail designated individuals within the relevant
ministry providing guidance to companies on implementation and checking on
compliance.208
Commentary to the UNGPs Principle 3 acknowledges the role which can be
played by national human rights institutions (NHRIs) “in helping states identify
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The series began as actual published reports in the 1990s and today is in mobile application form.
Sweat and Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://perma.cc/967Y-TULN.
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As noted above, a government funded central repository was set up by the Australian Act; it was
also recommended by the U.K. Houses of Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights in its
2017 report on the MSA. JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., supra note 5.
FLEX, supra note 129, at 20.
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JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., supra note 5.
Duthilleul & de Jouvenel, supra note 71.
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whether relevant laws are aligned with their human rights obligations and are being
effectively enforced, and in providing guidance on human rights also to business
enterprises and other non-state actors.”209 To move the business and human rights
agenda forward meaningfully at the domestic level, there are multiple benefits to
be gained from a specialized regulator in this area, as acknowledged in the UNGPs
regarding the role that can be played by NHRIs for guidance and enforcement.
While we do not envisage the role of the regulator proposed here to be carried
out by a NHRI,210 close cooperation between NHRIs and the regulator overseeing
human rights reporting would be beneficial for the latter to establish and develop
human rights expertise.
We recommend the establishment of a sui generis body, or a specialized
department within an existing body, to tackle both corporate and human rights
aspects of the reporting. This independent oversight mechanism should have
responsibility for reviewing reports and providing feedback to a sample of
companies on an annual basis, similar to the process established through the
Danish implementation of the E.U. NFRD. We take the view that there should
be provision for external parties to alert the oversight body, which can then
investigate the accuracy or adequacy of the information, and, if needed, compel
the company to correct and complement the disclosure. The oversight body
should be able to impose meaningful penalties for failure to comply akin to those
in the Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence Law. We stress the need for the oversight
body to have specialist subject matter knowledge that goes beyond that of a
corporate regulator to include the complexities of the human rights and modern
slavery issues which are the subject of the reports. Such specialist knowledge
could, for instance, come from the commission of “Sweat and Toil” type reports
or from close cooperation with NHRIs. The oversight body should analyze trends
in reporting and company practice, and also develop training and guidance in
relation to human rights, modern slavery, cases of forced labor, and human
trafficking, including their drivers and outcomes.211
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UNGPs, supra note 11, at 6.
Though this does not mean that NHRIs cannot be tasked with such a role. In the U.K., the Equality
and Human Rights Commission oversees and enforces gender pay gap reporting regulations that
place obligations on the public and private sector. See EQUALITY & HUM. RTS. COMM’N, CLOSING
THE GENDER PAY GAP (2018).
The SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Resource Guide is an example of the kind of guidance that
can be offered to companies by a regulator. CRIM. DIV. OF U.S. DOJ & ENF’T DIV. OF U.S. SEC,
FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2020). The lack of
equivalent state-sponsored guidance for the French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance is
conspicuous.
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VII. C ONCLUSION
We began this Article by acknowledging that HRDD and transparency can
contribute to improving human rights and labor conditions in global production
networks. But for due diligence and transparency to make a genuine contribution
to improving corporate accountability and to avoid potentially masking and
legitimating abuses, legislation should move away from heavily relying on a
market-based model of accountability. Numerous studies and reports show that
the existing frameworks have been inadequate. One obvious area of improvement
concerns the content of the disclosures.
There have also been calls for more regulatory involvement and a move away
from the market-led model of oversight, such as the establishment of a registry of
MSA reports in the U.K., or the introduction of effective sanctions for
noncompliance with the reporting standards. In this Article, we argued that statebased oversight and enforcement is an essential element for human rights
reporting to be effective. Without this element, even where mandatory HRDD is
introduced, there remain serious limitations on ensuring accuracy and
completeness of reports.
Our contribution to this reform agenda is twofold. First, we argue that there
is a need to support HRDD and transparency frameworks with a state-based
oversight mechanism that can also be supported by stakeholders. Second, we
emphasize that oversight for human rights reporting requires a fundamentally
different approach to institutional expertise and to risks and materiality than
financial or governance reporting. So far, oversight of a limited number of
reporting frameworks were entrusted to bodies specializing in traditional
corporate reporting without staffing these bodies adequately with human rights
expertise. We urged policymakers to move away from this one-size-fits-all model
and adopt a sui generis model of oversight marrying knowledge of corporate
reporting with human rights expertise to verify and enforce human rights and
modern slavery transparency regulations.
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